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ABSTRACT
If lending contracts in an economy take the form of unsecured, non-state-contingent debt, a
recession will often be associated with an increase in defaults and a reduction in the supply
of credit, which amplifies the contraction. Within this context, I consider the case when the
length of an unfolding recession is not immediately obvious; instead, it takes people time
to learn about a persistent recession. I apply this scenario to models where the unsecured
credit is represented by mortgage loans extended to households and by sovereign debt
extended to an emerging economy. I find that in both cases, accounting for uncertainty
and learning has a potential to improve the empirical performance of the models.
Chapter 1 explores the U.S. housing market where house prices show a lot of inertia.
I develop a general-equilibrium model with the market for housing and mortgages and
introduce uncertainty regarding the persistence of business cycles. I show that uncertainty
allows the model to better account for the sluggish dynamics of the housing market. In
Chapter 2, I use key U.S. macroeconomic data to empirically estimate the structural model
developed in Chapter 1. In order to compare the performance of the models with and with-
out uncertainty, I use likelihood-based estimation methods. The model with uncertainty
proves to be better capable of mimicking the long-lasting changes in house prices and other
observable variables.
Chapter 3 contains a theoretical model of a small open emerging economy that looks
to refinance its sovereign debt during an unfolding recession of uncertain length. A long
v
recession implies a higher chance of default in the future; a short recession means quick
recovery and solvency. Uncertainty about the unfolding scenario adds price risk to long-
term bonds and makes them costly to the borrower. Investors’ preferences shift towards
short-term bonds which mature before a lot of the uncertainty is resolved and before credit
events are likely to happen. Such uncertainty helps explain the empirical fact that emerging
economies tend to borrow short term during economic downturns.
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Chapter 1
LEARNING AND THE MARKET FOR HOUSING
1.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has identified the elephant in the room, which is the sheer
size of the housing market and its influence on the aggregate economy. Before the crisis,
the housing market had been booming for over a decade; rising house prices fueled the
lenders’ desire to create new, risky types of mortgages and offer them to the widest set of
households, including those with questionable credit history and unreported income. By
end of 2006, U.S. households were highly leveraged, with 10 trillion dollars worth of debt,
70% of which was due to mortgages.1 The end of the housing boom forced millions of
mortgages into negative home equity, leading to a surge in mortgage foreclosures, massive
mortgage write-offs by banks and a collapse of the multi-trillion-dollar market for mortgage-
backed securities. The banking sector experienced losses in net worth and a credit crunch.
What unfolded was the most severe financial crisis and the longest recession in decades.
Events like these require that economic theory provides a better understanding of the
housing market.
What is particularly puzzling about the housing market is how slow it is to adjust (see
figure 1.1). Following the crisis, the house price index continued to decline steadily for
five years;2 and the mortgage foreclosure rate has hovered above the one-percent mark for
over three years; more than double its average value for 2002–2005. However, it is common
knowledge that market prices should quickly absorb all the information about the current
and future state of economy. For example, the S&P500 Index shows that the downward
price adjustment in the market for capital lasted for five quarters. To explain this feature
1Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, Federal Reserve; Mian and Sufi (2009) evaluate the
contribution of household leverage to severity of the 2007–2009 recession
2There was a brief increase in house prices following 2008, when the Federal Reserve announced its
large-scale MBS purchase program. The effect of the program on house prices is unclear, though; see Fuster
and Willen (2010) for a discussion of the program’s effect on house price.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. economy and housing market. All the series are logged and adjusted for
inflation; GDP components are per capita. Foreclosure starts are quarterly rates.
of housing market dynamics, I suggest that economic agents did not initially recognize the
scope and length of the Great Recession. They observed the deteriorating economy, but
did not expect the decline to be persistent. In effect, they were over-optimistic. Households
were betting on temporary recession and on a continued housing boom; they were willing
to keep purchasing houses and obtaining large mortgages. As the economic downturn
continued, the agents eventually realized its scope. Such gradual recognition of a persistent
recession can explain the slow reaction of house prices. This mechanism can potentially
account for the slow evolution of other variables as well. For example, an unexpected
decline in house prices is the major driver of mortgage foreclosures.3
3See Gerardi et al. (2008)
3The goal of this paper is to study uncertainty about the economic growth as an ex-
planation for sluggish dynamics in the market for housing. I take three steps towards this
goal. First, I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with an endogenous
market for housing and mortgages that is driven by both transitory and persistent shocks.
There is a rich structure of shocks in the model, but I only allow the technology processes
to have shocks with different persistence. Technology growth would have two components:
a transitory component, or white noise; and a persistent component, an AR(1) process.
Second, I consider the situation of imperfect knowledge when economic agents cannot im-
mediately recognize the persistence of shocks. They can only observe the aggregate tech-
nology growth, but cannot observe its individual components. Using Kalman updating,
agents gradually learn about each component’s contribution by observing the evolution of
growth through time. And third, I evaluate the ability of the model with such uncertainty
to better explain the observed sluggishness in housing-market data. To that end, I look
at dynamic features of the model, such as impulse-response functions. I conduct a more
thorough likelihood-based empirical estimation for the models with perfect and imperfect
knowledge, compare their performance, and present the results in Chapter 2.
There are several arguments to motivate the assumption of imperfect knowledge about
the persistence of changes in technology growth. First, it is hard for a model with rational
expectations and perfect knowledge to generate any endogenous response of prices to a
shock other than a sharp swing followed by gradual recovery back to the steady state.
Learning under imperfect knowledge is a powerful tool that may protract the dynamic
response of the model variables, as well as improve their co-movement.4
Second, there is empirical evidence to support the assumption of imperfect knowledge
and learning, especially about the rate of technological growth. Edge et al. (2007) study
the long-run TFP growth rates predicted by professional forecasters5 and find that, despite
a plethora of complicated tools used by the professionals, their predictions are strikingly
4Edge et al. (2007) and Huang et al. (2009) provide similar arguments.
5Survey of Professional Forecasters, projections by the Congressional Budget Office.
4close to a simple learning mechanism based on linear Kalman updating. In addition, Foote
et al. (2012) argue that during the Great Recession, mortgage market participants did not
know the state of economy; they had beliefs that were ex-post over-optimistic and acted
rationally subject to them.
Finally, the assumption of imperfect knowledge about the shocks can help explain why
the price adjusts slower in the housing market than in the market for capital. Capital
market participants are financial market professionals who closely monitor the state of the
economy. The housing market encompasses virtually every household. It is reasonable
to believe that participants in the housing market have less knowledge about the state of
economy and the future of economic growth, so that they have to rely on learning more.
The novelty of my work is that it combines (i) a market for housing and mortgages
with (ii) imperfect knowledge and learning into a model that is (iii) tractable and can be
tested directly against the data. The crisis of 2007–2009 has brought the housing market
to many economists’ attention, and has motivated the development of models of housing
and collateralized household debt. Examples include Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011),
Corbae and Quintin (2013), Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009), Iacoviello and Pavan (2012),
Monacelli (2009), etc. The ability to track house prices, mortgage default rates, loan-to-
value ratios, and mortgage risk premiums endogenously in a general equilibrium set-up is a
recent achievement of this field that has become possible thanks to an increased interest in
the topic. To build a tractable model, I apply the structure of idiosyncratic investment risk
developed by Bernanke et al. (1999) to the market for mortgages. In this respect, my work
is similar to Forlati and Lambertini (2011).6 Neri and Iacoviello (2008) study the impact
of the housing market on aggregate economy. They introduce a rich technology structure
that accounts for long-run growth and a portion of short-run fluctuations in house price
and residential investment. My model has a similar structure of technology but expands
it to incorporate persistent and transitory shocks, as well as imperfect knowledge about
6The authors develop a dynamic new-Keynesian model to study the shocks originating from the market
for mortgages and their impact on the aggregate economy.
5them.
The literature on imperfect knowledge and learning has also caught up after the crisis.
I employ the learning mechanics similar to Gilchrist and Saito (2006). The authors extend
the dynamic new-Keynesian model with financial frictions (Bernanke et al., 1999) to im-
plement imperfect knowledge about the persistence of shocks and study its implications
for monetary policy. Orphanides and Williams (2007) study the implications of perpetual
learning (a rule of thumb based on simple OLS to forecast future prices) for the optimal
monetary policy. Eusepi and Preston (2008) show that perpetual learning helps an RBC
model amplify and propagate investment and labor supply. Fuster et al. (2010) entertain
the finding that agents rely heavily on the recent observations to form their forecasts and
show that such assumption helps account for volatility of asset prices and cyclical properties
of equity returns in an asset-pricing model.
Given the advances in the literature on housing and the capability of the literature
on learning to improve, or, at least, affect model dynamics, it is odd that little has been
done to combine the two. One known example is Burnside et al. (2011) who develop a
model with heterogeneous beliefs and an intricate learning mechanism. The authors argue
that it is difficult to generate protracted house price dynamics in case of homogeneous
beliefs because a change in beliefs quickly translates into changes in prices. Their learning
mechanism gradually spreads the beliefs like an infection, creating protracted dynamics
in house price. I view my work in this respect as an attempt to account for protracted
dynamics in house price in a model with homogeneous beliefs, and in a simpler general-
equilibrium set-up. In my model, imperfect knowledge and learning make changes in
homogeneous beliefs gradual and create sluggishness.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 defines the model and discusses its key as-
sumptions; section 1.3 describes the strategy to evaluate the model empirically; section 1.4
shows the results of empirical estimation; and section 1.5 concludes.
61.2 Model
I design a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous market for mort-
gages. Production consists of two sectors: consumption good production and housing con-
struction. Households derive utility from both consumption good and housing stock. There
are two groups of households: impatient borrowers and patient savers. Borrowers supply
fixed labor and earn wage; purchase consumption good and housing stock; and find it opti-
mal to use housing stock as collateral to borrow mortgages. Savers purchase consumption
good and housing stock; they find it optimal to lend mortgages to the borrowers and invest
into capital in both production sectors and earn mortgage interest and capital rent. Savers
also supply fixed labor and earn wage. Since the savers originate the capital, they claim all
the profit from production if such exists. Time is discreet; one period equals one quarter.
The description of the model is more efficient if I explain the workings of the mortgage
market first.
1.2.1 Mortgage contracts
To design a tractable market for mortgages with endogenous default rate, loan-to-value
ratio, and mortgage premium, I apply the mechanics of endogenous borrowing constraint
for entrepreneurs of Bernanke et al. (1999) to mortgages.7
For tractability, I make three simplifying assumptions. First, there are only one-period
mortgages available. In reality, mortgages usually have 30-year terms and households at
different stages of mortgage amortization behave differently; it is sufficient to mention that
households with recently acquired mortgages have a larger outstanding debt compared
to the value of the house and are more likely to go underwater and default.8 However,
tracking the distribution of households across the stages of mortgage loan repayment would
overcomplicate the model. I choose to focus on aggregate behavior of key mortgage market
indicators and expect that the model with one-period contracts does not change the results
7This approach is introduced by Forlati and Lambertini (2011).
8See Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009) for an example.
7qualitatively. Second, the model features fixed-rate mortgages only: interest rate is known
at the time of loan origination. There are adjustable-rate mortgages and contracts with
hybrid interest schedules available in the market,9 but the vast majority of mortgages are
FRM loans.10 Moreover, for a model with one-period loans, the choice between ARM
and FRM contracts is not important, since mortgage interest rates are re-negotiated every
period. Finally, the third simplification is that there is no recourse or punishment in case of
default. It implies that the household chooses to default on mortgage whenever the value
of the house is less than the outstanding debt.
Consider a household agent i that purchases a house Hi,t in period t and pays Hi,tPt
for it, where Pt is the house price in terms of consumption good. To finance this purchase,
the agent can use the house as collateral and obtain a one-period loan Bi,t with a fixed
interest rate r¯m,i,t. Next period, the outstanding debt is Bi,t(1 + r¯m,i,t), and the value of
the house is Hi,tPt+1Ωt+1(1−δh)ωi,t+1, where δh is the housing stock depreciation rate and
Ωt+1 is the aggregate shock to the housing stock size. The term ωi,t+1 is the idiosyncratic
shock to agent i’s housing stock size that has a log-normal distribution centered at 1:
ωi,t ∼ F (ω) i.i.d., such that lnωi,t ∼ N
(− 12σ2ω, σ2ω)⇒ E[ωi,t] = 1.
In absence of recourse or punishment, the agent will repay the loan if the value of the house
exceeds the outstanding debt:
Hi,tPt+1Ωt+1(1− δh)ωi,t+1 ≥ Bi,t(1 + r¯m,i,t).
For convenience, define the threshold value of idiosyncratic housing stock shock:
ω¯i,t+1 =
Bi,t(1 + r¯m,i,t)
Hi,tPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1 . (1.1)
9Corbae and Quintin (2013) study the contribution of non-traditional mortgages to the recession.
10FHFA’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey reports that in 1990–2010, the share of FRM mortgages averaged
around 70%.
8The household agent will repay the debt if the shock realization is above the threshold next
period: ωi,t+1 ≥ ω¯i,t+1.
The most commonly discussed complication of a model with endogenous default is that
only a fraction of households default on their loans in equilibrium. To account for it,
the model needs heterogeneous households and, as a result, one must explicitly track the
endogenous distribution of households in order to compute the default rate and aggregate
prices in the economy. This would tremendously complicate the solution of a general
equilibrium model, and a convenient approach to this problem is to assume perfect risk-
sharing within each household. Let each household be a unit mass of household agents,
where each agent i conducts the policy that is optimal for the aggregate household. Then,
if a variable Zt is a part of the household’s optimal policy, it is true that
Zt =
∫ 1
0
Zi,tdi, and Zi,t = Zt.
Thus, within each household, agents purchase equally-sized houses and get equivalent mort-
gage contracts, so the same threshold ω¯t+1 is applicable to every agent. Each agent is
subject to agent-specific idiosyncratic shock ωi,t+1, and a fraction of agents will default,
but the household pools the ex-post payoffs from mortgage arrangements and is not sub-
ject to idiosyncratic risk. Such set-up renders the model unable to describe potentially
interesting effects of mortgage market on household wealth distribution; however, it keeps
the solution highly tractable and still retains the essential interplay between the housing
purchases, chance of default, and the borrowing constraint. Henceforth, ’household’ stands
for a continuum of household agents, and index i is dropped.
The mortgage contract is an arrangement between the saver and the borrower. At
period t, the borrower purchases Ht and gets a loan Bt at fixed rate r¯m,t, so that next
period, her payoff will be
HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωdF (ω)−Bt(1 + r¯m,t)
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
dF (ω).
9That is, she only retains the houses and repay the loans of the agents who do not default.
In case of a default, the loan is repudiated and the house is lost to the saver, so the payoff
is zero. The saver provides Bt at period t, so next period, she will collect
HtPt+1Ωt+1(1− δh) (1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωdF (ω) +Bt(1 + r¯m,t)
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
dF (ω).
Fraction µ captures the cost of default paid by the lender. Foreclosed property is usually
sold at a significant discount; there may be legal fees, debt collector’s commission, etc. For
such costs, it seems appropriate to assume that they are proportionate to the size of the
house.
For brevity of notation, define
Γ(ω¯t) =
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω) + ω¯t
∫ ∞
ω¯t
dF (ω), (1.2)
G(ω¯t) =
∫ ω¯t
0
ωdF (ω), (1.3)
where Γ(ω¯t) is the debt repaid to the mortgage lender expressed as the share of the housing
stock collateral, and G(ω¯t) is the average idiosyncratic shock to housing stock associated
with repudiated mortgages. Using equations (1.1)–(1.3) and the fact that E[ω] = 1, the
borrower’s payoff becomes
HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
)
, (1.4)
and the saver’s payoff is
HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
)
.
In effect, a mortgage contract involves two parties co-paying for a house and splitting the
value of the house between them upon the mortgage contract settlement: the saver claims
Γ(·), the borrower retains 1−Γ(·), and µG(·) is lost due to default. To further the intuition,
10
let rm,t+1 be the realized saver’s return on mortgage:
Bt(1 + rm,t+1) = HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
)
(1.5)
Using (1.5), the borrower’s payoff can be intuitively rewritten as
HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
1− µG(ωt+1)
)−Bt(1 + rm,t+1) (1.6)
So, the mortgage arrangement is effectively such that the saver earns the ex-post return
rm,t+1 on the loan; while the borrower retains the house, repays the debt at ex-post rate
rm,t+1, and ends up bearing the cost of default.
1.2.2 Households
The total population is fixed at 1; a fraction Ψ are impatient and the remaining 1 − Ψ
are patient households. The patient household’s discount factor is higher that that of the
impatient one: 1 > βˆ > β > 0. (Note that variables and parameters marked with a hat are
pertinent to savers; the ones with no accent—to borrowers.) As a result, in equilibrium, the
impatient households are borrowers and the patient households are savers.11 Savers provide
borrowers with mortgages and invest into capital; they own the firms in the economy.
The infinitely-lived households derive utility from consumption good and housing ser-
vices. The lifetime utility function is time-separable and logarithmic:
Ut =
∞∑
j=0
βjEt
[
U(Ct+j , Ht+j)
]
, where U(Ct, Ht) = νt(lnCt + ψt lnHt);
where ψt is the weight of housing in the utility and νt is the inter-temporal preference
variable. Both ψt and νt are exogenous shock processes. A positive innovation to ψt
corresponds to an increase in housing demand; and a positive innovation to νt makes
11Using the households’ constrained optimization problems, it is straightforward to prove that the differ-
ence in discount factors guarantees that the borrowers find it optimal to borrow and not save, while savers
find it optimal to save and not borrow.
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households less thrifty, since they value current consumption and housing more compared
to their future values, given that the increase in νt is temporary.
Each period, savers maximize the expected utility by choosing the levels of consump-
tion Cˆt, housing stock Hˆt, mortgage lending Sˆt, and purchases of capital in consumption
sector Kˆy,t and construction sector Kˆx,t, subject to the budget constraint:
Cˆt + HˆtPt + Sˆt +
Kˆy,t
Ak,t
+ Kˆx,t = Hˆt−1Pt(1− δh)Ωt + (1 + rm,t)Sˆt−1+
+ (rx,t + 1− δx) Kˆx,t−1 +
(
Ry,t +
1− δy
Ak,t
)
Kˆy,t−1 +Wt + Πˆt.
(1.7)
Ak,t is the shock to the cost of consumption-sector capital measured in units of con-
sumption good; this technology process mostly refers to non-tangible capital and is more
applicable to consumption good production rather than construction.12 Savers’ wealth in-
cludes housing stock retained from the previous period; return on mortgage lending; return
on capital investment in both sectors equal to capital rent plus the retained capital stock
net of depreciation; wage Wt; and construction-sector profit Πˆt. As I explain in section
1.2.3, only the construction sector earns non-zero profit.
The optimality conditions are the following:
U ′
Cˆ,t
Pt = U ′Hˆ,t + βˆEt
[
U ′
Cˆ,t+1(1− δh)Pt+1Ωt+1
]
(1.8)
U ′
Cˆ,t
= βˆEt
[
U ′
Cˆ,t+1
(
Ry,t+1 +
1− δy
Ak,t+1
)]
(1.9)
U ′
Cˆ,t
= βˆEt
[
U ′
Cˆ,t+1 (rx,t+1 + 1− δx)
]
(1.10)
U ′
Cˆ,t
= βˆEt
[
U ′
Cˆ,t+1 (rm,t+1 + 1)
]
(1.11)
Equation (1.8) is the first-order condition with respect to housing stock: on the left hand,
an increment in housing stock would cost some utility due to sacrificed consumption, but on
the right hand, the household gains utility because housing stock directly increases utility
12Neri and Iacoviello (2008) consider this process as well. A more intuitive formulation is Kˆy,t = Ak,tCˆy,t,
where Cˆy,t is the amount of consumption good spent on consumption-sector capital.
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and because it adds to the next period’s wealth. Euler equations (1.9)–(1.11) predict that
mortgage lending and capital investment should all yield the same expected return.
The borrowers choose consumption Ct, housing purchase Ht, and the mortgage contract
{Bt, r¯m,t} to maximize the expected utility subject to the constraints:
Ct +HtPt −Bt = Wt +Ht−1Pt(1− δh)Ωt
(
1− Γ(ωt)
)
(1.12)
Bt = Et
[
HtPt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
)
/(1 + rm,t+1)
]
(1.13)
ω¯t =
Bt−1(1 + r¯m,t−1)
Ht−1Pt(1− δh)Ωt (1.14)
According to the budget constraint (1.12), the borrower funds her purchases by wage
income Wt and mortgage payoffs. The saver’s participation constraint (1.13) and the
definition of the default threshold (1.14) constrain the borrower’s maximization problem:
assumably, the borrower knows what implications a mortgage contract {Bt, r¯m,t} has for
the chances of default and that her mortgage repayment must provide the expected return
1 + rm,t+1 required by the saver.
The optimality conditions are the following:
U ′C,tPt = U ′H,t + βEt
[
U ′C,t+1Pt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
1− Γ(ωt+1)
)]
+U ′C,tEt
[
Pt+1(1− δh)Ωt+1
(
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
)
/(1 + rm,t+1)
] (1.15)
βEt
[
U ′C,t+1Γ′(ω¯t+1)
]
= U ′C,tEt
[(
Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)
)
/(1 + rm,t+1)
]
(1.16)
The first-order condition with respect to housing stock (1.15) is similar to that of the
saver, except that, apart from direct impact on utility and an increase in next period’s
wealth, one more benefit of housing stock for the borrower is that it serves as collateral
and increases access to debt (the last term on the right-hand side). Equation (1.16) is the
first-order condition with respect to mortgage interest rate r¯m,t. Recall that the share of
the housing stock claimed by the saver due to the mortgage contract is Γ(ω¯) − µG(ω¯); it
is an increasing function of ω¯ (see section A.1.1 of the Appendix). That is, ceteris paribus,
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a higher mortgage rate r¯m,t increases the chance of default and decreases the borrower’s
payoff from mortgage; but, on the other side, the saver will claim a larger fraction of the
housing stock, which, in effect, expands the borrower’s capability to get a larger debt.
1.2.3 Production
Consumption good sector employs labor ny,t and capital stock Ky,t−113 to produce the
consumption good Yy,t. There is a technology shock Ay,t that is specific to consumption
good production. The resulting output is Yy,t = (Ay,tny,t)1−αyKαyy,t−1. The sector is com-
petitive and the firms earn zero profit. Profit-maximization gives the standard expressions
for wage and capital rent in the sector:
Wy,t = (1− αy)A1−αyy,t n−αyy,t Kαyy,t−1, (1.17)
Ry,t = αyA1−αyy,t n
1−αy
y,t K
αy−1
y,t−1 . (1.18)
The consumption good has three uses: it can be consumed by households, used to purchase
capital, and an amount Xt of consumption good can be used as an intermediary input for
housing construction: Yy,t = ACt + IKt +Xt.
Construction sector employs labor nx,t, capital stock Kx,t−1, consumption good Xt,
and aggregate housing stock retained from the previous period H¯t to produce new housing
stock. Housing construction includes installation of household appliances and furnishing,
which motivates the consumption good being a part of housing production function. It also
simplifies the derivation of house price and construction sector’s capital rent and wage. As
for the retained housing stock, there are two good reasons to make it one of the construction
sector’s inputs. First, housing construction, or, more broadly, creation of additional housing
stock, includes renovations of the existing houses. And second, inclusion of housing stock in
housing construction function adds inertia to it. For an example, a higher level of housing
13I use the time index to indicate the period at which the value of the variable is known. In terms of
timing, consumption good production happens at the beginning of the period, and savers have decided
upon the scale of capital investment at the end of the previous period.
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construction today would add to the retained housing stock tomorrow and, hence, add to
housing construction tomorrow as well, and so on. Effectively, it adds volatility to house
prices, since changes in levels of residential investment are more related to swings in the
house price rather than the level of housing construction. It is a useful feature of the model
if one of its goals is to predict house price movement. In this respect, the retained housing
stock is a counterpart for land that is used in similar models with housing sector.14 Finally,
there is a technology shock Ax,t specific to housing construction. The resulting output is
the following:
Yx,t = (Ax,tnx,t)1−αxk−αxx−αxhKαxkx,t−1Xαxxt H¯
αxh
t . (1.19)
The retained housing stock is defined simply as
H¯t =
(
ΨHt−1 + (1−Ψ)Hˆt−1
)
(1− δh) Ωt. (1.20)
Construction sector uses the retained housing stock for free—this assumption explains the
existence of positive profit from construction sector Πt in equilibrium, which belongs to
the savers. This profit is very small, however.15 The profit of the sector is the following:
Πt = (Ax,tnx,t)1−αxk−αxx−αxhKαxkx,t−1Xαxxt H¯
αxh
t Pt −Wx,tnx,t − rx,tKx,t−1 −Xt. (1.21)
Profit-maximization yields the prices for housing, labor, and capital stock:
Pt =
Xt
αxx
1
Yx,t
, (1.22)
Wx,t =
Xt
αxx
1− αxk − αxx − αxh
nx,t
, (1.23)
rx,t =
Xt
αxx
αxk
Kx,t−1
. (1.24)
14Neri and Iacoviello (2008) provide analogous justification for the inclusion of land in housing output
function.
15Rather than having zero housing-sector profit, it is important that housing stock rent does not affect
the decision to purchase housing by the households . Also, the contractors do not pay housing rent when
renovating the houses.
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Notice that house price is negatively related to all factor inputs except for consumption
good Xt. The presence of consumption good as one of the factors of housing construction
allows for easy control of housing supply elasticity. Marginal products of labor and capital
also positively depend on consumption good.
The housing sector resource constraint equates household purchases of housing stock net
of aggregate housing stock retained from the previous period with the newly-constructed
housing:
ΨHt + (1−Ψ)Hˆt − H¯t = Yx,t. (1.25)
1.2.4 Shocks
Technologies Ay,t, Ax,t, and Ak,t are non-stationary stochastic processes defined as
for i ∈ {y, x, k}, lnAi,t = lnAi,t−1 + γi,t + ui,t, ui,t ∼ N(0, σ2u,i), i.i.d. (1.26)
γi,t = (1− ρi)γi + ρiγi,t−1 + vi,t, vi,t ∼ N(0, σ2v,i), i.i.d. (1.27)
Technology Ai,t includes a trend component γi,t which is stationary around γi and subject
to shock vi,t labeled as persistent shock. The second component of technology growth is
a transitory shock ui,t. Since the technologies are non-stationary, I have to de-trend the
model in order to solve it.16
I consider three non-technological exogenous processes:
lnψt = ρψ lnψt−1 + (1− ρψ) lnψ + ψ,t, ψ,t ∼ N(0, σ2ψ), i.i.d. (1.28)
ln Ωt = ρΩ ln Ωt−1 + Ω,t, Ω,t ∼ N(0, σ2Ω), i.i.d. (1.29)
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + ν,t, ν,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν), i.i.d. (1.30)
First, ψt is the share of housing stock in household utility. It is a housing demand shock
that shifts household preferences towards housing and affects the house price and the level
16Details of de-trending and the de-trended system are provided in part A of the Appendix.
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of residential investment. Second, Ωt is a shock to aggregate retained housing stock. It
could be viewed as a shock to housing stock depreciation which changes the availability of
existing housing. Finally, νt is a shock variable that makes households value current period’s
consumption and housing services differently and affects their inter-temporal choice.
The equilibrium is defined dynamically by equations (1.7)–(1.30) and a set of market-
clearing conditions: (1 − Ψ)Sˆt = ΨBt; Wy,t = Wx,t; ny,t + nx,t = 1; (1 − Ψ)Kˆy,t = Ky,t;
(1−Ψ)Kˆx,t = Kx,t; (1−Ψ)Πˆt = Πt.
1.2.5 Model Solution
Before introducing imperfect knowledge, it is convenient to outline the solution of the
model. Because of the technology processes, the model is non-stationary. It can be ap-
proximated by the following linear state-space form:
zt = Φ0 + Φ1s1,t + Φ2s2,t + Φ3t; (1.31)
s1,t = A1s1,t−1 +B1εt; (1.32)
s2,t = s2,t−1 +B2εt. (1.33)
In this formulation, zt is the vector of logged observable variables. Vector s1,t represents
the set of log-deviations from the balanced growth path. In other words, the system (1.32)
is the de-trended log-linearized version of the model. Vector εt contains all the shocks
to exogenous processes, including the transitory and persistent shocks to technologies:
εt = ({j,t}j , {ui,t}i, {vi,t}i)′. Notice that what matters for the de-trended system are not
the levels of technology Ay,t, Ak,t, and Ax,t, but their growth rates. Given i ∈ {y, k, x},
I redefine equations (1.26) and (1.27) in terms of log-deviations from the steady-state
growth rates in order to include them in the system (1.32):
g˜i,t = γ˜i,t + ui,t; (1.34)
γ˜i,t = ρiγ˜i,t−1 + vi,t, (1.35)
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where gi,t = Ai,t/Ai,t−1 is the growth rate, so that g˜i,t = lnAi,t − lnAi,t−1 − γi is the
log-deviation of the growth rate from its steady state; and γ˜i,t = γi,t − γi is the deviation
of the growth rate’s persistent component. Consequently, the state vector s1,t contains
these variables: s1,t = (. . . , {g˜i,t}i, {γ˜i,t}i)′. Note that s1,t is stationary, which justifies
the use of log-linearization for this component of the model. Vector Φ0 captures the
steady-state values of the de-trended observable variables. The last two terms capture
the non-stationary stochastic and deterministic components of technology processes. In
the Appendix, section A.1.2 explains the de-trending procedure; section A.1.3 provides the
complete de-trended system; section A.1.4 provides its log-linearized version correspondent
to equation (1.32); and section A.1.6 explains how different components of the system (1.31)
capture the technology processes.
1.2.6 Imperfect Knowledge and Learning
The model with perfect knowledge implies that agents can perfectly observe both persistent
and transitory innovations to exogenous processes. In case of imperfect knowledge, agents
only observe the total level of productivity—or, equivalently, its growth rate—but the
shocks ui,t and vi,t and the persistent component γi,t are unobservable. For an example,
the agents can observe a large increase in technology Ai,t but cannot immediately tell if the
higher growth is due to the persistent component vi,t and, thus, if the growth rate will be
higher in the future as well; or if it is a one-period increase due to the transitory component
ui,t. To resolve this uncertainty, the agents have to wait and observe the growth rate for
several periods in order to gradually learn about the nature of the shock. I assume that
the agents use a simple linear steady-state Kalman filter for this purpose. The motivation
behind the steady-state filter is that the agents have observed a long history of productivity
in the economy and have an idea about the transitory and persistent shocks, their volatility
and persistence. For a technology Ai,t, the agents are assumed to know the values σvi, σui,
ρi, and γi. An interesting question (which I address in section 1.4.3) is whether the values
that the agents know correspond to the actual processes, or if they are different from the
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truth—but the point is that the agents are assumed to rely on their belief and implement
the steady-state filter.
Define ˆ˜γi,t = E(γ˜i,t|g˜i,0, . . . , g˜i,t) as the inferred value of the technological growth’s
persistent component at time t given all available observations of the growth rate up to
period t. Then, given the equations (1.34) and (1.35), the standard result is the following
Kalman-updating equation:17
ˆ˜γi,t = λig˜i,t + (1− λi)ρi ˆ˜γi,t−1.
This expression summarizes the way households learn about the value of persistent com-
ponent of technological growth by means of the steady-state Kalman filter. Parameter λi
is the steady-state Kalman gain:
λi =
di − (1− ρ2i ) +
√
(1− ρ2i )2 + d2i + 2(1 + ρ2i )di
2 + di − (1− ρ2i ) +
√
(1− ρ2i )2 + d2i + 2(1 + ρ2i )di
, (1.36)
where di = σ2v,i/σ2u,i relates the volatilities of persistent and transitory shocks. The Kalman
gain positively depends on di and ρi. Intuitively, if the persistent shock is more volatile
compared to the transitory shock or if the persistent component has a higher autocorrela-
tion coefficient, the agents infer that a sequence of higher growth rates is more likely to be
the result of a shock to persistent component rather than a sequence of transitory shocks.
Figure 1.2.6 demonstrates the process of learning. There is a shock to technology that
increases the growth rate gi,t. The graph on the left shows the case of persistent shock.
Initially, the agents do not completely realize that the shock is persistent (there is a chance
that it is a transitory shock), so the inferred value of the persistent component is lower than
the actual value. As agents keep observing the evolution of the growth rate, they gradually
learn that the shock has been persistent, since the observed path of the growth rate is
far more likely to be the result of one persistent shock rather than a series of transitory
17The Kalman-updating equations are derived in section A.1.5 of the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse-responses: innovation to technology growth rate. Evolution of the
persistent technology growth component γ˜i,t due to one-percent positive persistent and
transitory shock (vi,t and ui,t, respectively). The solid black lines show the actual responses
of the variable. The dashed lines show the inference about this unobservable variable
implied by Kalman filtering. The dark dashed lines are for σ2iv/σ2iu = 0.5, and the light
dashed lines are for σ2iv/σ2iu = 0.25. Autoregressive coefficient for the persistent component
is set at ρi = 0.9.
shocks. The two lines eventually converge. A relatively higher variance of transitory shock
(low di) corresponds to slower learning, since a sequence of positive transitory shocks that
can explain the observed growth rate path becomes more likely. On the right-side graph,
the shock is to the transitory component, and the learning mechanics are analogous. The
persistent component does not change, but initially, agents realize that the shock might
be persistent. After observing zero growth rates in all subsequent periods, the agents
eventually learn that the shock is transitory.
In order to impose the case of imperfect knowledge on the model, I take the linear system
(1.32) and replace the actual values of persistent technology components and shocks to tech-
nologies with the ones inferred through Kalman filtering, so that the state vector becomes
sˆ1,t = (. . . , {g˜i,t}i, {ˆ˜γi,t}i)′ and the vector of shocks becomes εˆt = ({j,t}j , {uˆi,t}i, {vˆi,t}i)′.
Furthermore, for each of the technology processes, I add a set of equations that relate the
Kalman-filtered estimates and the actual values of components of technology processes:
vˆi,t = λi(γ˜i,t + ui,t)− λiρi ˆ˜γi,t−1;
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uˆt = (1− λi)(γ˜i,t + ui,t)− (1− λi)ρi ˆ˜γi,t−1;
γ˜i,t = ρiγ˜i,t−1 + vt.
1.3 Estimation
The empirical exercise outlined below seeks to establish how technological shocks contribute
to the observable data pertinent to aggregate economy and to the market for housing
in particular, and how the assumption of imperfect knowledge affects this contribution.
For this purpose, I perform the classical maximum likelihood estimation of the model
under both perfect and imperfect knowledge. The parameters estimated by means of MLE
are all the parameters describing the exogenous processes (shock variances, autoregressive
coefficients, steady-state technological growth rates); all the other parameters are calibrated
so that the steady state of the model matches certain empirical targets. Given the observed
data ZT = {zt}Tt=1 and a parametrization θ, I can compute the log-likelihood function
l(ZT |θ) = ln ΠTt=1 Pr(zt|Zt−1, θ) by means of sequential Kalman filtering. In order to find
the vector of parameters θ∗M that maximizes the log-likelihood function for the models with
perfect and imperfect knowledge M∈ {P, I}, I use a combination of Newton methods.18
1.3.1 Relating the Model and Data
The aggregate resource constraint is a combination of the borrower’s and saver’s budget
constraints (1.12) and (1.7):
ΨCt + (1−Ψ)Cˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Household
consumption
+ Ky,tAy,t − (1− δy)
Ky,t−1
Ay,t−1 +Kx,t − (1− δx)Kx,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-residential
investment
+
18I start the search for the parameter vector θ∗M using my own version of the BFGS routine; then, I use
Chris Sims’ optimization algorithm (http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize/) to ’polish’ the result.
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ΨHt−1Pt(1− δh)µE[ω|ω < ω¯t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of default
+Pt(ΨHt + (1−Ψ)Hˆt − H¯t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residential
investment
= Yt + Yx,tPt︸ ︷︷ ︸
GDP
(1.37)
This equation conveniently relates the model to the four key variables taken from the data:
aggregate consumption ACt, which is the sum of household consumption and the cost
of default; non-residential investment IKt; and residential investment IHt. The fourth
observable variable is the house price, Pt. The data set includes the four quarterly series
ZT = {ACt, IKt, IHt, Pt}Tt=1 and spans 1975–2013. The full description of the data is
provided in section A.2 of the Appendix.
1.3.2 Calibration
The vector of parameters θ that is estimated by MLE describes the exogenous processes:
θ = {ρi, γi, σi}. I calibrate the rest of the parameters to match the steady state of the model
with a corresponding number of empirical targets.19 Table 1.1 summarizes the calibration.
Saver’s discount factor is set to match the quarterly interest rate, which corresponds
to the real expected return on capital in my model. For 1975–2006, I have estimated
the average quarterly 3-Month Treasury Bill rate adjusted for expected inflation to be
0.5%.20 Data show that the equity risk-premium over the T-Bills was 1.7% in quarterly
terms for the same period;21 and, for 30-year corporate bonds rated Aaa by Moody’s, the
risk-premium over the Treasury bonds with the same maturity was 0.2%.22 These values
imply a reasonable range for the real interest rate between 0.7% and 2.2% per quarter.
I set βˆ = 0.9888 to match the target of 1.5%. Given βˆ, the borrower’s discount factor
β, cost of default parameter µ, and variance of idiosyncratic housing stock shock σω are
19The technology growth rates γi, i ∈ {y, k, x} obtained via MLE affect the steady state of the model,
which slightly complicates the calibration. However, they are quite insensitive to calibration, so I use the
growth rates obtained after a few initial MLE runs to calibrate the other parameters.
20Inflation is the growth in CPI for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter (BLS). Expected inflation
is the OLS prediction of the quarterly inflation rate based on four lagged values.
21Ibbotson Risk Premia Over Time Report, 2013
22Release H.15 by the Federal Reserve
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Table 1.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Meaning
βˆ 0.9888 Saver’s discount factor
ψ 0.17 Share of housing in utility function
αy 0.25 Share of capital in consumption good production
αxk 0.1 Share of capital in housing construction
αxh 0.1 Share of housing stock in housing construction
αxx 0.1 Share of consumption good in housing construction
δy 0.02 Depreciation rate of consumption capital
δx 0.025 Depreciation rate of housing construction capital
δh 0.015 Depreciation rate of housing stock
N 1.0 Population size
Ψ 0.6418 Borrowers’ share in population
β 0.9587 Borrower’s discount factor
σω 0.1902 Standard error of idiosyncratic shock to house size
µ 0.1172 Cost of mortgage foreclosure
chosen jointly to match the loan-to-value ratio, default rate, and mortgage premium. The
annual mortgage premium is chosen to be 1.5% based on the average 30-year mortgage
premium over the 30-year Treasury bonds for 1977–2006.23 Following the literature, the
target default rate is chosen to be 2%, which is the average delinquency rate for residential
estate loans for the decade preceding 2007, according to the Federal Reserve. Neri and
Iacoviello (2008) report the average loan-to-value ratio to be 76% between the years 1973
and 2006.24 At the rate of default of 2%, such high loan-to-value ratio would correspond
to an extremely low borrower’s discount factor. I set a more moderate target of 65%. The
resulting values of µ and σ are in line with the literature;25 the borrower’s discount factor
is quite low, which is to say that the model implies a very impatient borrower in order for
her to accept the mortgage that has a high chance of costly default.
Capital depreciation in consumption good sector is set at δy = 0.02. Together with
23Ibid.
24Finance Board’s Monthly Survey of Rates and Terms on Conventional Single-Family Non-farm Mort-
gage Loans (table 19)
25Forlati and Lambertini (2011) set σ = 0.2 and µ = 0.12. The cost of debt parameter µ is quite
conservative; for a detailed discussion of foreclosure discounts, see Campbell et al. (2009).
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capital share in consumption good production function, it helps to set the share of non-
residential investment in GDP. Housing sector capital stock is relatively too small for it
to have a significant impact on the aggregate investment share. Housing sector capital
depreciation is set at δh = 0.025 to reflect the fact that capital stock has shorter life in
construction sector. The share of capital is set at αy = 0.25 in consumption good sector
and αxk = 0.1 in construction sector, which is less capital-intensive. These shares are
considerably lower than the conventional one third due to the definition of GDP which
only includes private consumption and private fixed investment. Davis and Heathcote
(2005) use the NIPA Input-Output tables to estimate the share of capital to be 0.13 in
construction, 0.24 in services, and 0.31 in manufacturing. The shares of consumption good
and housing stock in construction output are chosen to be αxx = 0.1, αxh = 0.1. These
parameter values are according to Davis and Heathcote (2005), which set these shares
for consumption good and land. I am using the empirically estimated share of land to
measure the contribution of housing stock because housing stock used in construction acts
as a counterpart to land in my model.26
The share of housing in the utility is set in combination with housing depreciation rate
to match the share of residential investment in GDP and the ratio of housing stock value
to GDP: ψ = 0.17, δh = 0.01. The share of borrowers in total population equals the share
of homeowners that had mortgages in 2006:27 Ψ = 0.6418.
Table 1.2 shows that the steady-state of the model is close to the empirical targets that
I have set. Given the calibration, I estimate the remaining parameters θ = {γi, ρi, σi} via
the maximum-likelihood estimation.
26See section 1.2.3 for details
27Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2006–2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Table 1.2: Steady-state performance of the model
Measure Model Target Target source
Quarterly interest rate, % 1.51 1.50 Data, Federal Reserve
IK/GDP , % 13.60 15.00 Data, BEA
IH/GDP , % 6.14 6.00 Data, BEA
p×H/GDP 1.14 1.36 Neri and Iacoviello (2008)
K/GDP , non-residential 2.31 2.05 Neri and Iacoviello (2008)
K/GDP , residential 0.04 0.04 Neri and Iacoviello (2008)
Annual mortgage premium, % 1.50 1.50 Data, Federal Reserve
Mortgage default rate, % 2.00 2.00 Data, Federal Reserve
Loan-to-value ratio, % 64.60 65.00 Data, FHFA
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
1.4.1.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1.3 presents the parameter estimates with associated standard errors28 for the cases
of perfect and imperfect knowledge. While the shock variances do not describe their rel-
ative importance, the table reveals a few notable facts. First, the processes for which
ambiguity about the persistence of technology shocks matters are capital and consumption
technologies. Under imperfect knowledge, these are the only processes with both persistent
and transitory shocks significant. At the same time, agents always know that the transi-
tory component is driving the construction technology because the persistent component
is nonexistent. Second, capital technology shocks have significant variances only under
imperfect knowledge. Third, imperfect knowledge makes both transitory and persistent
components of consumption technology significant, while perfect knowledge renders the
transitory shock insignificant. I look into the reasons behind these facts below.
In both cases, housing demand shock ψt is insignificant. Retained housing supply shock
28Standard errors are evaluated using delta-method and the Hessian that is numerically estimated for
the likelihood function.
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Table 1.3: Estimated parameters
Case I: Imperfect Knowledge
Technological shocks γi ρi σui σei
Consumption production (gy) 0.0069 0.4945 0.0054 0.0054
(0.0009) (0.0725) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Capital creation (gk) -0.0095 0.8916 0.0123 0.0022
(0.0015) (0.0401) (0.0031) (0.0003)
Construction (gx) -0.0032 0.9900 0.0199 0.0000
(0.0016) (x.xxxx)† (0.0012) (0.0000)
Non-technological shocks ρi σi
Inter-temporal preference (ν) 0.9900 0.0000
(x.xxxx)† (0.0000)
Housing demand (ψ) 0.9900 0.0000
(x.xxxx)† (0.0000)
Retained housing supply (Ω) 0.0000 0.0184
(0.0000) (0.0011)
Case II: Perfect Knowledge
Technological shocks γi ρi σui σei
Consumption production (gy) 0.0060 0.3791 0.0000 0.0074
(0.0009) (0.0328) (0.0000) (0.0005)
Capital creation (gk) -0.0079 0.3579 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0014) (0.4741) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Construction (gx) -0.0099 0.9900 0.0204 0.0007
(0.0016) (x.xxxx)† (0.0012) (0.0001)
Non-technological shocks ρi σi
Inter-temporal preference (ν) 0.9900 0.0236
(x.xxxx)† (0.0026)
Housing demand (ψ) 0.9900 0.0000
(x.xxxx)† (0.0000)
Retained housing supply (Ω) 0.2832 0.0105
(0.0505) (0.0014)
† The values of autoregressive coefficient were restricted to not exceed 0.99—this re-
striction is only effective for the housing construction technology and inter-temporal
preference in case of perfect knowledge.
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Ωt is either a white noise or a very nonpersistent process. Inter-temporal preference shock
νt is only significant under perfect knowledge. It seems that the contribution of capital
technology shock is replaced by that of the inter-temporal preference shock under perfect
knowledge; both shocks affect the saver’s decision to invest. Inter-temporal preference
shock is estimated to be extremely persistent; I put a cap of ρν = 0.99 on its autoregressive
coefficient. Wen (2006) explains that a positive shock to inter-temporal preference variable,
when it is transitory, makes households value current utility relatively much more, so
they prefer to consume more and reduce investment; the result is that consumption and
investment are negatively related. A more persistent shock also increases the value of future
utility by more and allows for better co-movement between consumption and investment.
1.4.1.2 A Note on Comparative performance
The model with imperfect knowledge (I) performs better in terms of likelihood: the
achieved log-likelihood is l(ZT |θ∗I , I) = 1637.9; for the case of perfect knowledge (P),
the value is l(ZT |θ∗P ,P) = 1617.9, where θ∗ is the vector of parameters that maximizes
the likelihood function. While this is a considerable difference for log-likelihood values,
the two numbers are not directly comparable, since the two models have different struc-
tures and do not simply correspond to two alternative parameter specifications. A more
appropriate way to compare the two models would be to specify a prior over the parameter
space p(θ|M) for the two models of perfect and imperfect knowledge M∈ {P, I} and use
numerical methods to compute the marginal likelihood p(ZT |M) =
∫
p(ZT |θ)p(θ|M)dθ.
Then, it is straightforward to compare the two models in terms of posterior odds in favor
of the model with imperfect knowledge:
PO = p(ZT |I)
p(ZT |P) .
I conduct this experiment and outline the results in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.
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1.4.2 Impulse Responses
The goal of this subsection is to shed light on how imperfect knowledge affects the dynamics
of the model. I limit the discussion to responses to shocks that are significant under
imperfect knowledge.
1.4.2.1 Consumption technology shocks
Panel A of figure 1.3 shows impulse responses of key variables due to a negative one-
standard-deviation shock to persistent component of consumption technology growth gy,t.
Consumption good is used to pay for capital and new housing stock, so a less productive
consumption good sector results in lower consumption and investment, which all eventually
stabilize at 1.07 percent below the pre-shock balanced growth path. Construction capital
stock initially increases because construction sector becomes relatively more productive,
but eventually, scarcer consumption good makes construction capital stock fall. Because
consumption sector becomes relatively less productive than construction, housing demand
declines together with house prices, leading to a higher mortgage default rate and lower
mortgage lending. Notice how imperfect knowledge delays the responses: initially, people
believe in quick recovery, so consumption, housing demand, and house prices remain higher;
these variables adjust as households gradually recognize the persistent shock.
Overall, imperfect knowledge delays the responses of house price, consumption, and
mortgage default rate. This is the kind of protraction which Burnside et al. (2011) argue
to be hard to achieve when the household beliefs are homogeneous. In part, they prove
to be right: this protraction is very limited under the estimated parametrization, and the
responses for the two models converge after 2–3 quarters. Kalman gains are defined by
parameters of technology processes according to equation (1.36), and consumption tech-
nology process is such that agents learn about the nature of the shock very quickly. Still,
the persistent shock has an ability to explain a lot of longer-term dynamics in observable
variables, since its contribution builds up over time while the immediate impact is subdued.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse-responses. Panel A: persistent consumption technology shock, vy.
Panel B: transitory consumption technology shock, uy. Percentage deviations of non-
detrended variables from the balanced growth path due to one-standard-deviation negative
shock. Solid lines represent the case of certainty; dashed lines represent uncertainty. For
default rate, the values are absolute, compared with their steady-state values (dotted lines).
Numbers near the arrows show where the deviations will stabilize after 400 quarters.
Notably, imperfect knowledge creates additional redistribution of wealth between bor-
rowers and savers during a recession. Immediately after the persistent shock, borrowers
are too optimistic about the future house price and bet on it by obtaining large mortgages
and making large housing purchases. These decisions turn out to be bad ex post: in the
periods following the shock, unexpectedly low house price results in higher default rate
and reduces the borrowers’ net worth, consumption, and housing demand. Meanwhile,
savers are able to purchase cheaper housing stock and use the extra savings to maintain
higher consumption. Section A.3 of the Appendix contains details on wealth redistribution
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between the household groups.
Panel B of figure 1.3 depicts the case of transitory shock. Essentially, the logic behind
the responses is similar. Imperfect knowledge amplifies the immediate responses, since
agents fear a long recession; which is the opposite to the case of a persistent shock. Com-
pared to the case of perfect knowledge, such variability in responses makes both persistent
and transitory shocks versatile tools to describe the dynamics of the observed variables
that complement each other: persistent shock explains a lot of low-frequency dynamics,
and transitory shock is better at explaining short-term fluctuations.
1.4.2.2 Capital technology shocks
Reaction of the model to capital technology shocks illustrates yet another dimension along
which imperfect knowledge can improve the dynamics: co-movement of key observable
variables. Panels A and B of figure 1.4 show responses due to a negative shock to capital
technology’s persistent and transitory component, respectively. Consider the transitory
shock first. It makes consumption sector’s capital more expensive in current period. In case
of perfect knowledge, savers initially reduce consumption-capital investment and choose to
allocate their wealth to consumption, construction capital, and housing purchases. Because
of higher housing demand from savers, house price increases, default rate falls, and more
expensive housing requires that borrowers get larger mortgages. Eventually, because of
lower stock of consumption sector capital, output in consumption sector declines, together
with aggregate consumption, house price, and capital investment in both sectors. Of course,
consumption-sector capital is affected by this shock the most in the long run. Note that
initially, the response is such that aggregate consumption, house price, and residential
investment increase while capital investment declines.
The picture is the opposite for the persistent shock. The cost of consumption capital
does not only increase in current period but keeps growing at a higher rate in subse-
quent periods. In case of perfect knowledge, it means that investors not only pay more
for consumption-sector capital; they expect it to be worth even more next period. In ef-
30
Panel A
-0.69
Consumption, AC
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
-0.54
House price, P
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
-0.69
Capital investment, IK
−5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
-0.69
Resid. investment, IH
−10.0
−5.0
0.0
5.0
Default rate, %
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
0 10 20
-0.69
Mortgage lending S
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0 10 20
-2.72
Consumption capital
−2.0
−1.0
0.0
1.0
0 10 20
-0.69
Construction capital
−20.0
−10.0
0.0
10.0
0 10 20
Panel B
-0.41
Consumption, AC
−0.5
0.0
0.5
-0.32
House price, P
−0.5
0.0
0.5
-0.41
Capital investment, IK
−4.0
−2.0
0.0
2.0
-0.41
Resid. investment, IH
−5.0
0.0
5.0
Default rate, %
1.9
2.0
2.1
0 10 20
-0.41
Mortgage lending S
−0.5
0.0
0.5
0 10 20
-1.63
Consumption capital
−2.0
−1.0
0.0
1.0
0 10 20
-0.41
Construction capital
−5.0
0.0
5.0
0 10 20
Figure 1.4: Impulse-responses. Panel A: persistent capital technology shock, vk. Panel B:
transitory capital technology shock, uk. Percentage deviations of non-detrended variables
from the balanced growth path due to one-standard-deviation negative shock. Solid lines
represent the case of certainty; dashed lines represent uncertainty. For default rate, the
values are absolute, compared with their steady-state values (dotted lines). Numbers near
the arrows show where the deviations will stabilize after 400 quarters.
fect, the return on one unit of consumption good spent on consumption-sector capital
rises, and savers increase investment into consumption sector at the cost of consumption,
housing purchases, and construction-sector capital. The initial response is that aggregate
consumption, house price, and residential investment decline while non-residential invest-
ment rises. Eventually, all four observable variables stabilize below the pre-shock balanced
growth path.
Imperfect knowledge improves the co-movement of capital investment with other vari-
ables due to capital technology shocks. This is especially evident for persistent shock,
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where a lot of counter-factual dynamics of the perfect-knowledge model in the first few
initial periods upon shock is washed out. Capital technology shocks can be an important
driver of long-term dynamics of capital investment, and imperfect knowledge helps elimi-
nate the counter-cyclicality of this variable. Huang et al. (2009) and Edge et al. (2007) have
similar findings with respect to learning and co-movement. Under perfect knowledge, the
contribution of capital technology shocks is replaced with that of inter-temporal preference
shock νt, which does not generate permanent deviations from the balanced growth path
and which, speaking in terms of the likelihood, is a costlier explanation of low-frequency
movement in capital investment.
1.4.2.3 Construction technology and housing supply shocks
Panel B of figure 1.5 demonstrates the impact of the shock to aggregate housing stock
retained from the previous period. It could be viewed as a shock to depreciation or an
(negative) overbuilding shock.29 Lower retained housing stock implies higher house price.
Higher house price does not fully compensate for the effect of the shock on the value of
the housing stock, so the default rate increases. Expensive housing, as well as higher
return on construction capital, shifts investors’ preference towards construction capital;
capital investment increases, as well as residential investment, while consumption falls.
This shock is specific to the market for housing and may explain a lot of dynamics in
residential investment.
The last shock that is significant under imperfect knowledge is the transitory construc-
tion technology shock (panel A of figure 1.5). Lower productivity in construction sector
reduces the supply of housing and increases the house price and mortgage borrowing; the
mortgage default rate falls. Construction capital is less productive; it drives the total
capital investment down. Despite higher house prices, the decline in construction sector’s
output causes residential investment to decline as well; it helps that households substitute
29Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) model an overbuilding shock with similar implications for house prices
and default rate.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse-responses. Panel A: transitory construction technology shock, ux.
Panel B: housing supply shock, uΩ. Percentage deviations of non-detrended variables
from the balanced growth path due to one-standard-deviation negative shock. Solid lines
represent the case of certainty; dashed lines represent uncertainty. For default rate, the
values are absolute, compared with their steady-state values (dotted lines). Numbers near
the arrows show where the deviations will stabilize after 400 quarters.
away from expensive housing towards consumption. Mortgages become a relatively more
lucrative saving option due to lower default rates and lower return on construction capital.
Note that house price is the only variable that deviates from the balanced growth path
permanently. This shock has a large and lasting effect on house price and can explain a
lot of its movement.
Unfortunately, the model with imperfect knowledge renders the persistent component
of construction technology insignificant, while it could be the source of more persistent
dynamics of house price. The implication (confirmed below) is that the model with imper-
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fect knowledge does not generate much additional inertia in house price compared to the
model with perfect knowledge. To resolve this issue, I consider the case when the Kalman
gain specific to construction technology λx is not tied to the parameters that describe this
technology process; rather, it is an extra parameter that is estimated using MLE.
1.4.3 Unrestricted Kalman gains
The assumption of imperfect knowledge can improve the model’s performance even further
if I do not assume that the Kalman gain used to infer about the transitory and persistent
components of technological growth is tied to the properties of the technology process (via
equation (1.36)). Instead, I assume that it is a free parameter that needs to be estimated.
Intuitively, it implies that agents are not only unable to observe whether the source of
technological growth is transitory or persistent; they also do not know how the technology
actually evolves. More precisely, they have an idea of what the technological process might
be (i.e., they assume some values {σui, σvi, ρi}), but it does not necessarily correspond
to the actual process. It is likely that agents in the economy do not have a precise idea
about the underlying technological processes that drive the economy. For example, Fuster
et al. (2010) argue that agents, when forming forecasts, rely excessively on the most recent
observations.
I only consider the unrestricted Kalman gain for construction-specific technology, for
two reasons. First, the assumption that households do not know the true process that
drives the house price is in line with the argument that housing market participants are
less informed about the economy than capital investors. Construction-specific technology
accounts for much of house price dynamics, unlike consumption- and capital-specific tech-
nologies that mostly affect consumption and capital investment. And second, I find it more
illustrative to study the change of one Kalman gain in isolation. Of all three technologies,
the Kalman gain for construction technology is the best choice, because it is the technology
that contributes to house prices the most. After all, the goal of the whole exercise is to
better explain the house price dynamics.
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Table 1.4: MLE results for the model with unrestricted Kalman gain
Model Log-likelihood ρx σvx σux λx
Imperfect knowledge:
– tied Kalman gain 1637.9 — 0.0000 0.0199 —
– untied Kalman gain 1657.5 0.5917 0.0174 0.0041 0.00
Perfect knowledge 1617.9 0.9900 0.0007 0.0204 —
The assumption has strong implications. Table 1.4 summarizes the results of MLE.
The log-likelihood for the model with imperfect knowledge and untied Kalman gain is
1657.5; which is higher than 1637.9 and 1617.9 for the models with restricted Kalman
gains. When the Kalman gain is a free parameter, it is estimated to be zero (λx = 0):
agents completely ignore the chance that the changes to the rate of construction-technology
growth can be persistent. For example, in case of a negative persistent shock, the agents
keep making over-optimistic forecasts until the rate of technological growth converges to
its steady-state level. Notice how the variance of persistent component is relatively large
under untied Kalman gain (σvx = 0.0174): the persistent component becomes a powerful
explanatory variable in case of agents’ stubborn reluctance to update their forecasts.
Such slow ’learning’ (or absence of such) in case of persistent shocks implies that house
price dynamics are more protracted. To confirm this statement, I plot spectral densi-
ties of the observable variables’ first differences derived for the three models and compare
them to less parametric estimates. In figure 1.6, the less parametric estimates include
an estimate based on VAR30 and non-parametric kernel density estimates constructed for
each individual series. First, notice that with Kalman gain tied to technology process,
the model under imperfect knowledge is better at generating low-frequency dynamics for
capital investment and, to a much smaller extent, for consumption—this is mostly because
capital technology shocks are significant only under imperfect knowledge. As for house
price and residential investment, imperfect knowledge alone does not contribute to their
30I perform the VAR estimation for the data with six lags and Cholesky ordering that is standard for the
literature: {ACt, IKt, IHt, Pt}
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Figure 1.6: Spectral densities of the first-difference series normalized by the unconditional
variance. The horizontal axes measure cycles per quarter. Spectral density is calculated
for the models using the deep parameters obtained from MLE and compared against less
parametric estimates: an estimate based on VAR, and completely non-parametric estimates
for individual differenced series based on covariances.
low-frequency dynamics. If anything, the spectral density of house price is slightly heavier
on the low-frequency range under perfect knowledge, because under perfect knowledge, the
persistent construction technology component is estimated to be significant. The picture
dramatically changes after the Kalman gain is untied from the technology process. It is
especially evident for residential investment and house price: because of volatile persistent
component of construction technology, and because agents fail to learn about it, the vari-
ables specific to housing market gain a lot of density in low-frequency range and become
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much more resemblant of the data. There is also an evident gain in the low-frequency
range of the spectral densities of consumption and capital investment.
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Figure 1.7: Contribution of technology shocks to house price: house price as predicted by
smoothed innovations to technologies only, with other shocks shut down.
Figure 1.7 exemplifies how gains in the low-frequency range of house price’s spectral
density can transform into higher value of the likelihood function. As explained above,
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technology shocks can account for most of long-run dynamics of the house price, which is
shown on the bottom panel of the figure. As the top two panels show, it is construction-
specific technology that can account for movements of house price that correspond to
low-frequency domain. Notice that contribution of technologies to house-price dynamics is
similar for all three models. While the price paths predicted by technological innovations
are similar, the cost of these paths in terms of the likelihood function can be different. In
terms of the likelihood, it is less costly to explain the protracted dynamics of house price
by means of a small number of shocks that generate protracted responses rather than by
a sequence of shocks that have transitory impact on house price.
1.5 Conclusion
There are two frequently discussed channels through which imperfect knowledge and learn-
ing allow general equilibrium models to better explain the observed data. First, they
create a protracted evolution of economic variables; and, second, they may improve the
co-movement between economic variables. I extend this mechanism to the model with en-
dogenous market for housing and show that the same results apply to the housing market
variables. It is particularly applicable to house prices, which experience long periods of
steady growth and decline. The key point is that learning is a tool that helps account
for the protracted dynamics of housing market variables, and can improve the predictive
power of general equilibrium models with housing.
In line with Neri and Iacoviello (2008), I show that technology processes can account
for most of long-run dynamics of observable variables, including house prices. I assert that
persistent technological shocks are important for periods of consistent growth or decline
in the variables. They become even more important when there is imperfect knowledge
about the persistence of shocks and learning, which creates additional protraction and may
improve co-movement.
To further the argument, I untie the learning process from the features of technology
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processes and conclude that learning can contribute even more to the model’s explanatory
power when its parameterization is more flexible. When applied to technology specific to
housing market, the likeliest unrestricted specification of the learning mechanism is such
that the economic agents largely disregard the possibility that house price dynamics can be
subject to persistent changes. In case of the crisis of 2007–2009, such learning mechanism
implies that housing market participants were stubbornly optimistic about the future of
the market, which was why house prices were so slow to decline and the foreclosure rate
was persistently high.
Chapter 2
LEARNING AND THE MARKET FOR HOUSING:
A LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 presents two versions of a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with
endogenous housing market. In one version, economic agents have perfect knowledge about
the persistence of exogenous shocks hitting the economy; the other version introduces
imperfect knowledge and learning. A preliminary analysis of the dynamic features of the
two models finds that the model with learning has a potential to better explain the sluggish
dynamics in the market for housing in the U.S. The key intuition is that in presence of
imperfect knowledge about the length of business cycles, agents only gradually learn about a
long recession or boom. Therefore, persistent shocks do not create immediate adjustments
to observable variables; instead, the response to such shocks is protracted. In a DSGE
model, learning creates inertia observed in the U.S. market for housing.
For a proper formal test of this claim, a Bayesian likelihood-based analysis seems to be in
order. The results of a maximum-likelihood estimation performed in Chapter 1 correspond
to two different structural models rather than different parameter specifications within one
structure. The parameter vector is transformed into the state-space form differently for the
two models, so the maximized likelihood functions are not directly comparable. Bayesian
estimation, on the contrary, helps compare the two models by means of posterior odds.
An additional methodological benefit that comes with Bayesian inference is that it does
not require an assumption (null hypothesis) that one of the DSGE models is true; the two
models are treated symmetrically.1
The goal of this chapter is to conclude which of the two competing DSGE models
1See Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Francisco Rubio-Ramı´rez (2004) for a discussion of advantages of
posterior-odds ratio.
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from Chapter 1 is a likelier explanation of the key U.S. data on consumption, investment,
and housing, which spans 1975–2013. I form a prior about the distribution of the key
parameters that define the dynamic characteristics of the two models. Then, I evaluate
both models against the data and find the parameters’ posterior distributions by means of
a Markov chain Monte Carlo integration with Metropolis random-walk sampling algorithm
(An and Schorfheide, 2007). With a few exceptions, the results are in line with MLE output
presented in Chapter 1. Finally, I use the routine described by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001)
to find the marginal likelihoods and compute the posterior-odds ratio for the two models.
The resulting odds are 90:1 in favor of the model with imperfect knowledge and learning,
a strong evidence. To explain how the model with learning is better at capturing the
dynamics of the observed variables, I provide variance decomposition for the two models.
In this chapter, section 2.2 outlines the method to deliver the empirical results; sec-
tion 2.3 describes the results; section 2.4 looks into variance decomposition; and section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Methodology
Let P denote the model with perfect knowledge, and I denote the model with imperfect
knowledge about shock persistence. In order to compare the empirical performance of the
two models, I use posterior odds in favor of the model I:
PO = p(Z|I)
p(Z|P)
pi(I)
pi(P) .
The first fraction, the Bayes Factor, contains marginal likelihoods that stand for proba-
bilities of the observed data Z given a specified model M ∈ {I,P}. The second fraction
contains the prior belief about the likelihood of the two models. I assume no prior odds,
so the ratio is reduced to the Bayes Factor:
PO = p(Z|I)
p(Z|P) . (2.1)
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Marginal likelihood, therefore, is the central goal of the outlined empirical exercise:
p(Z|M) =
∫
L(Z|θ,M)pi(θ|M)dθ. (2.2)
Here, L(Z|θ,M) is the likelihood function evaluated for a parameter vector θ, and pi(θ|M)
is its prior density. The deep parameters that define the structure of the model are grouped
into two vectors, θC and θ. Vector θC contains parameters that are calibrated to match the
steady state of the model to certain empirical targets. I treat vector θC as fixed and focus
the Bayesian inference on vector θ, which contains the parameters that are most responsible
for the dynamic behavior of the model: AR coefficients {ρi}i and standard deviations {σj}j
of exogenous shock processes, as well as technological growth rates {γk}k.2
Given a parameter specification θ, I can cast either one of the models in linear state-
space form and apply Kalman filter in order to compute the value of the likelihood func-
tion.3 Following the literature, I specify a tractable prior parameter distribution pi(θ|M).
However, I do not have a tractable posterior distribution of θ, which equals the product of
the two terms (up to a constant factor of proportionality): p(θ|M, Z) ∝ L(Z|θ,M)pi(θ|M).
Therefore, I cannot find the marginal likelihood analytically. Moreover, direct sampling
from the posterior distribution is impossible, which complicates numerical integration of
the expression (2.2).
To overcome this problem, I use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling with
Metropolis random-walk algorithm, which is the common approach in the literature.4 In
brief, the sampling proceeds as follows. Given current draw θk, a candidate to become the
next draw θ∗k+1 is sampled from a well-defined distribution q(θ|θk), which serves to replace
the unknown posterior distribution p(θ|M, Z). The candidate θ∗k+1 is accepted as the next
2Notice that I have to de-trend the data every time I compute the likelihood L(Z|θ,M) for a certain θ.
3Chapter 1 describes the procedure that converts both competing models into linear Gaussian state-space
forms, by means of de-trending and log-linearization. See section 1.2 for details.
4See An and Schorfheide (2007), Chib and Greenberg (1995), Guerron and Nason (2012) for a detailed
discussion of the approach.
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draw θk+1 with probability α(θk, θ∗k+1):
α(θk, θ∗k+1) = min
{
L(Z|θ∗k+1,M)pi(θ∗k+1|M)
L(Z|θk,M)pi(θk|M)
q(θ∗k+1|θk)
q(θk|θ∗k+1)
, 1
}
. (2.3)
With probability 1− α(θk, θ∗k+1), the candidate is rejected, and the current observation is
accepted as the new draw: θk+1 = θk.
A proper distribution q(θ′|θ) should resemble the posterior density p(θ|M, Z) and have
adequately thick tails, so that the sampling algorithm vigorously traverses the non-trivial
part of the domain of the posterior density. I choose a normal distribution: q(θ′|θ) ∼
N(θ, (X ′X)×Σ). To obtain a suitable variance-covariance matrix Σ, I use numerical hill-
climbing methods to find θˆ that maximizes the function g(θ) = L(Z|θ,M)pi(θ|M) and
employ the inverse of its Hessian evaluated at θˆ. The term (X ′X) represents a tuning
factor that modifies the estimated matrix Σ in order for the sampling algorithm to accept
the new candidates at a suitable rate. I use a scalar in lieu of this factor, such that
the acceptance rate is between 0.25 and 0.35. Because q(θ′|θ) is symmetric, the fraction
q(θ∗k+1|θk)/q(θk|θ∗k+1) can be dropped from expression (2.3). I set the sample size at M =
400, 000 to ensure convergence. I choose the initial draw θ0 randomly in the vicinity of
the estimated posterior mode θˆ, and run a burn-in stage of 50,000 draws. To reduce auto-
correlation, I thin the series down to every 100th draw. Section 2.3.3 discusses quality of
the obtained samples.
Given a proper choice of the stand-in distribution q(θ′|θ), a starting point θ0, and a suf-
ficiently large thinning step, the described technique replicates random sampling from the
posterior distribution p(θ|M, Z). Therefore, I can estimate the moments of the posterior
distribution using their sample counterparts. The marginal likelihood p(Z|M), however,
cannot be represented as a moment of the posterior distribution.5 Chib and Jeliazkov
(2001) provide an efficient approximation to marginal likelihood that employs the output
5See Geweke (1999) for details.
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of MCMC sampling. The approach is based on the basic marginal likelihood identity:
p(Z|M) = L
(
Z|θ∗M,M
)
pi
(
θ∗M|M
)
p
(
θ∗M|M, Z
) , (2.4)
where the likelihood function, the prior density, and the posterior ordinate are evaluated
at a high-density point θ∗M of the posterior distribution, such as the posterior mode θˆM
estimated for each model. The only unknown term on the right-hand side of the identity
is the posterior ordinate, which is estimated as
pˆ
(
θ∗M|Z,M
)
=
M−1 ΣMi=1 α
(
θk, θ
∗
M
)
q
(
θ∗M|θk
)
J−1 ΣJj=1 α
(
θ∗M, θj
) , (2.5)
where {θk}Mk=1 are draws simulated by the MCMC algorithm, and {θj}Jj=1 are a separate
sample drawn from q
(
θ|θ∗M
)
.
The following section provides the results of the described procedures.
2.3 Estimation
2.3.1 Calibration and Prior Distributions
Likelihood-based estimation procedures that I use focus on log-deviations from the steady
state of a de-trended model. For this reason, deep parameters that mostly define the
steady state are difficult to estimate within this framework.6 I calibrate such parameters
to make the steady state of the model match key empirical targets that are true for the U.S.
housing market (e.g., mortgage default rate, loan-to-value ratio, etc.) and for the economy
in general (e.g., the great ratios I/Y , K/Y ). The calibration is the same for both estimated
models, since imperfect knowledge and learning are purely dynamic characteristics of the
model that do not affect the steady state.7
As for the likelihood-based estimation, it targets the parameters that define the trend
6For example, Iacoviello and Pavan (2012) and Leeper et al. (2010) provide similar arguments.
7Section 1.3.2 of chapter 1 describes the procedure and table 1.1 summarizes the calibrated values.
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and the features of the shock processes. To form their prior, I use the existing literature,
as well as the results of MLE reported in Chapter 1. In particular, these results show
that technological growth rates fall within two percentage points from zero. Their prior is
specified as normal distribution with mean 0.001 and standard deviation 0.01. Standard
deviations of all the shock processes are assumed to have inverse gamma distribution with
mean 0.001 and standard deviation 0.01. Such prior allows for consideration of near-
zero standard deviations. All the auto-regressive coefficients are assumed to have beta
distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.15 in the prior, which is loose enough
to allow a wide range of estimates. Overall, this prior is similar to the one used by Iacoviello
and Pavan (2012). Table 2.1 summarizes the prior and figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate it
graphically.
2.3.2 Posterior Distributions and Posterior Odds
Table 2.1 reports the key moments of the posterior distributions estimated for the two
models, and figures 2.1 and 2.2 compare them to prior distributions. They are generally in
line with Chapter 1: parameter estimates from Chapter 1 (see table 1.3) are within the 95%-
confidence intervals of the posterior distributions. The posterior distributions estimated for
the model with imperfect knowledge (I) are significantly different in a few notable cases,
however. The growth rate of construction technology γx seems to be distributed much lower
than the value γMLEx = −0.0032 reported in Chapter 1. It translates into lower housing
stock production and a higher long-term growth rate of house price generated by model I.
In addition, two processes, persistent component of consumption technology growth and
retained housing shock, show significantly higher AR coefficients (ρy and ρΩ) and lower
standard deviations (σvy and σΩ). This could be due to impact of prior distributions that
are focused above 0.5 for AR coefficients and close to zero for standard deviations.
The key differences between the estimates for the two models remain the same as in
Chapter 1. It is only in case of imperfect knowledge that technologies of consumption-good
and capital creation have both persistent and transitory components with sizable variances.
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Table 2.1: Prior and posterior distributions for the two estimated models
Prior distribution Posterior, model P? Posterior, model I?
Parameter Type Mean St. D. Mean 2.5% 97.5% Mean 2.5% 97.5%
γy Consumption tech. growth N 0.005 0.01 0.0049 0.0019 0.0073 0.0069 0.0052 0.0087
γx Construction tech. growth N 0.005 0.01 −0.0107 −0.0136 −0.0074 −0.0142 −0.0166 −0.0114
γk Capital tech. growth N 0.005 0.01 −0.0051 −0.0101 0.0021 −0.0092 −0.0117 −0.0064
ρy Consumption tech. AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.384 0.317 0.450 0.678 0.551 0.782
ρx Construction tech. AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.997 0.992 0.999 0.998 0.995 0.999
ρk Capital tech. AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.623 0.334 0.894 0.834 0.737 0.907
ρψ Housing preference AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.724 0.414 0.944 0.722 0.395 0.940
ρν Intertemp. preference AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.994 0.984 0.998 0.753 0.511 0.943
ρΩ Retained housing AR coeff. B 0.700 0.15 0.332 0.189 0.511 0.121 0.052 0.226
σvy Consumption pers. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0073 0.0064 0.0083 0.0033 0.0023 0.0046
σvx Construction pers. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004
σvk Capital pers. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0005 0.0002 0.0012 0.0025 0.0017 0.0033
σuy Consumption trans. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0007 0.0002 0.0023 0.0060 0.0049 0.0070
σux Construction trans. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0204 0.0182 0.0231 0.0193 0.0170 0.0219
σuk Capital trans. st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0008 0.0002 0.0024 0.0085 0.0052 0.0131
σψ Housing preference st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0009 0.0002 0.0036 0.0008 0.0002 0.0029
σν Intertemp. preference st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0472 0.0141 0.1019 0.0006 0.0002 0.0018
σΩ Retained housing st. dev. G−1 0.001 0.01 0.0087 0.0046 0.0122 0.0142 0.0122 0.0162
? P denotes the model with perfect knowledge; I denotes the model with imperfect knowledge.
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As impulse-response functions have indicated, the model with imperfect knowledge can use
these exogenous processes effectively to explain the dynamics of the observable variables.
First, in presence of significant transitory shocks, learning allows the persistent shocks to
have lasting impact on the model’s state, while keeping the immediate response subdued—
this feature is particularly useful for generating low-frequency dynamics. And second,
learning can wash out bad co-movement immediately upon a persistent shock, while keep-
ing its long-term effect. The latter is especially applicable to capital-technology shocks.
Because model P cannot employ the pairs of persistent and transitory technology shocks
as effectively, it relies on other processes to interpret the data. Since capital technology
is estimated to have infinitesimal variances in case of perfect knowledge, inter-temporal
preference shock process replaces it to explain investment dynamics. The standard de-
viation σν seems to be very large for model P, with posterior mean at 0.0472 and the
95%-confidence interval spanning values up to 0.1019. These high values put the validity
of linear approximation of the model under question.
The idea that the model with imperfect knowledge is better at mimicking the sluggish
dynamics of the observable variables finds its formal confirmation. I estimate the marginal
likelihoods of the two models and find the following key result:
pˆ(Z|I)
pˆ(Z|P) ≈ 90. (2.6)
The odds are estimated to be 90:1 in favor of the model with imperfect knowledge, which,
according to Dave and DeJong (2007), signifies ”strong evidence”. In order to better explain
why the model I uses combinations of transitory and persistent shocks more efficiently, I
analyze variance decomposition for the two models in section 2.4 below. Before any further
analysis, a note on quality of the performed simulations is in order.
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Figure 2.1: Posterior distributions: perfect knowledge. Black (dashed) lines represent the
prior distributions; red (solid) lines represent the posterior distributions.
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Figure 2.2: Posterior distributions: imperfect knowledge. Black (dashed) lines represent
the prior distributions; red (solid) lines represent the posterior distributions.
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2.3.3 Quality of Simulated Samples
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that the data set is uninformative with respect to certain
parameters; for these parameters, the estimated posterior distribution is similar to the
prior. In case of model P, it is true for capital-creation technology, transitory component
of consumption-sector technology, and housing-preference shock. In case of model I, it
applies to housing-preference and retained-housing shock processes. The reason is that
these shock processes do not add explanatory power to the models. Why? Suppose that,
for a model M, a shock process s is unimportant, so that the true value of its standard
deviation σs is zero. Then, the likelihood function L(Z|θ,M) will achieve high values when
the standard deviation σs ∈ θ is chosen close to zero. Therefore, within the Metropolis
sampling algorithm, a parameter candidate θ∗k+1 has a chance to become an accepted draw
if it is such that σ∗s,k+1 ≈ 0, where σ∗s,k+1 ∈ θ∗k+1. The prior for standard deviations is such
that most of its density is concentrated in the region below 0.002. If the standard deviation
σ∗s,k+1 of an ’unimportant’ shock process is sampled from this region, its value is too small
for any significant negative impact on the likelihood. The sampling routine will deliver
the posterior that will be almost identical to the prior. In addition, given next-to-zero
variance, the AR coefficient has no impact on the likelihood. Therefore, the posterior of
the AR coefficient should be similar to the prior if the corresponding standard deviation is
distributed very close to zero.
The cost of having such parameters in vector θ is lower quality of the sample sim-
ulated by the MH algorithm. When a series generated by the sampling algorithm is of
high quality, its plot resembles a white-noise process. For this to happen, the variances of
the sampling distribution q(θ′|θ) must be comparable in size to the variances of the pos-
terior distributions. This is problematic for the parameters describing the ’unimportant’
shock processes, for which the posteriors are similar to the prior distributions. A sampling
distribution with large variances for such parameters would often supply candidates θ∗k+1
50
that contain unrealistic standard deviations or AR coefficients (σ∗ < 0 or ρ∗ /∈ [0, 1]).8 In
order to maintain the acceptance rate of the sampling algorithm, the sampling distribution
q(θ′|θ) must assign low variances to the troubled parameters. The result is that the se-
ries simulated for these parameters exhibit poor mixing, high serial correlation even after
thinning, and slow convergence of the sample moments.
In part B of the appendix, figures B.1–B.6 plot the series along with their auto-
correlations and recursive means. These measures indicate lower quality of the sample
for the parameters of the ’unimportant’ shock processes. A straightforward way to im-
prove the quality of sampling for these parameters is to increase the sample size and the
thinning step. This is quite time-consuming. It seems sufficient, however, to notice that
the estimated posterior distribution pˆ(θ|M, Z) shows no significant covariance between in-
dividual parameters.9 Therefore, the problem with quality of sampling is not contagious.
As long as standard deviations of the ’unimportant’ shock processes are drawn from the
vicinity of zero, their values, along with the corresponding AR coefficients, seem to have
little impact on the likelihood L(Z|θ∗k+1,M), on the validity of the results for the rest of
the parameters, and marginal likelihood in general.
2.4 Interpreing the Results: Variance Decomposition
2.4.1 Forecast variance
Figure 2.3 demonstrates forecast variance decomposition of the observable variables for
the two models; it helps better understand the relative importance of shocks. Consump-
tion technology accounts for most of variability in consumption; virtually all of it in the
long run. Consumption and capital technologies explain most of variability in capital
investment, since capital investment depends on efficiency of capital production and on
8Notice that the prior density for AR coefficients is loose yet bounded by zero and one; while the prior
density for standard deviations is skewed to the right and cut off by zero from below.
9Another indication of independence of the parameters in the posterior is that the inverse of the Hessian,
which is estimated at the maximum θˆ of g(θ) = L(Z|θ,M)pi(θ|M) and used as a variance-covariance matrix
Σ in the sampling distribution q(θ′|θ), is practically a diagonal matrix.
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Figure 2.3: Forecast variance decomposition for the two models. Bar heights represent
percentages of the variance of the forecast growth contributed by each of the shocks. The
forecast horizon is up to 40 quarters.
availability of consumption good to spend on capital. In case of perfect knowledge, there is
no capital technology shock; instead, there is inter-temporal preference shock that affects
the consumption-saving decision by households and accounts for a lot of variation in capital
investment, even for longer horizon (around 25% for a 40-quarter forecast). Variability in
residential investment and house price is mostly due to construction technology and hous-
ing supply shocks. Notably, housing supply shock, despite its transitory nature, remains an
important contributor to the variance of residential investment (up to 30–60 percent) even
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for longer horizons—this is because retained housing is one of the inputs of construction
sector, and a decrease in housing stock suppresses construction for a long time. For both
capital investment and consumption, housing supply shock is important in the short run
because, through house prices, it affects the share of wealth households allocate to housing
purchases rather than consumption and saving. Around 20% of house-price variance is also
due to consumption technology shocks, since houses are paid for in units of consumption
good.
Technology shocks seem to be the most important drivers; and more so over the longer
forecast horizon, since they create permanent deviations from the balanced growth path.
Persistent technology shocks, despite their small estimated variances, are especially im-
portant. Under imperfect knowledge, persistent components of capital and consumption
technologies prove to be important for all four variables. Under perfect knowledge, persis-
tent component of construction technology matters for capital and residential investment
and especially for house price. The only consumption technology component that exists
under perfect knowledge is the persistent one, which contributes a lot to all the observable
variables but residential investment. The conclusion is that, to a large degree, long-run
evolution of variables simulated by the two models can be attributed to technology shocks,
and in particular to their persistent components.
2.4.2 Historical variance
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 depict the historical variance decomposition of growth in observable vari-
ables according to the model with imperfect knowledge. The two figures clarify the nature
of technology shocks and the ways they explain the data. Technology shocks are important
for low-frequency dynamics; they have permanent impact on the balanced growth path,
and they build up their influence on the course of economy over time. For these reasons,
technology shocks, especially persistent shocks, contribute the most during the periods of
long-lasting steady growth or decline in the variables; and the abrupt swings in growth are
likely to be due to transitory technology or non-technology shocks. This is in line with
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Figure 2.4: Historical variance decomposition, imperfect knowledge, aggregate consumption and capital investment. White dots
represent the observed percentage growth in the variables; bar heights represent contributions of each of the shock to the growth.
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Figure 2.5: Historical variance decomposition, imperfect knowledge, residential investment and house price. White dots represent
the observed percentage growth in the variables; bar heights represent contributions of each of the shock to the growth.
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the common intuition that technology processes drive the economy in the long run, while
the short-run fluctuations could be also due to a plethora of transitory factors, such as
preference shocks, financial shocks, monetary policy shocks, etc.
Persistent components of consumption- and capital-specific technologies are important
for variation in aggregate consumption and investment. Figure 2.5 shows that house price
growth also depends on persistent consumption-specific technology shock; however, its
contribution is very often in the opposite direction to the observed growth. In other words,
the general direction of house price is not always in line with consumption; there are other
factors that drive the house price growth. A booming aggregate economy and a growing
aggregate consumption do not always correspond to growing house prices, and vice versa.
This observation may point to the existence of house price bubbles; alternatively, it may
point to economic developments specific to housing market, such as introduction and spread
of mortgage-backed securities. The decomposition shows that variables specific to housing
market are the ones that define the evolution of house price. Housing supply shock accounts
for a lot of abrupt swings of house price, and construction technology defines the direction
of house price movement that generally prevails over several quarters.
However, the model with imperfect knowledge renders the persistent component of con-
struction technology insignificant, while it could be the source of more persistent dynamics
of house price, like it is in the case of perfect knowledge.10 The implication is that the
model with imperfect knowledge may not generate much additional inertia in house price
compared to the model with perfect knowledge. As I argue in section 1.4.3 of Chapter 1, a
way to address this problem is to consider more flexible learning processes that are not nec-
essarily based on the true features of technology processes. This is an interesting direction
to take this empirical work in the future.
10Appendix B provides historical variance decomposition for the case of perfect knowledge.
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2.5 Conclusion
Likelihood-based Bayesian inference is the appropriate strategy to compare different struc-
tural models that compete to describe the observed data. I apply this commonly used
technique to the two models introduced in Chapter 1. I find that imperfect knowledge
and learning about the persistence of business cycles significantly improve the empirical
performance of a DSGE model with housing. The estimated odds are 90:1 in favor of the
model that assumes imperfect knowledge, which is strong evidence. Variance decomposi-
tion suggests that, because the observed data exhibits inertia, the model with learning is
a better fit due to its ability to use persistent shocks to generate low-frequency dynamics.
Chapter 3
SOVEREIGN DEBT MATURITY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
3.1 Introduction
Despite the obvious differences, unsecured government debt is theoretically similar in many
ways to household debt; and, like the household debt, it has been a central topic during
the Great Recession. Debt maturity is an important aspect of business cycles, since it
affects the ability of the government to service the debt and efficiently reallocate resources
between different moments in time. A sovereign with a large short-term debt has to rely on
subsequent rollovers, which may be costly in bad times and even trigger a sovereign debt
crisis or outright default.1 Why do emerging economies tend to borrow short-term during
recessions, then? Recent literature has provided evidence as well as explanations for this
phenomenon. Broner et al. (2013) suggest that optimal maturity is an outcome of a risk-
sharing problem: the borrower prefers long-term debt because it provides more flexibility
at arranging for debt repayment and protects against rollover crises when the prospects of
the economy deteriorate; the lenders prefer short-term debt because it is less exposed to
price risk. The authors argue that investors become more risk-averse during recessions and
the equilibrium debt maturity shortens. In other words, a shorter maturity is a result of
a shock to the supply of loanable funds. According to Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012),
the long-term debt insures the borrower against losses in cases when national income falls:
a low-income state implies a higher chance of default and a lower value of outstanding
debt. At the same time, investors can price the short-term debt more effectively in order
to ensure its repayment; therefore, short-term debt has a higher price and provides a better
access to liquidity.2 During low-income states, it follows, the urgent need for liquidity on
the borrower’s side makes short-term debt preferable.
1For an example, see Cole and Kehoe (2000).
2Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) also argue that investors pay more for short-term bonds because the
long-term debt suffers from lack of commitment to repay the debt.
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I propose a different explanation for shortened maturity during recessions in emerging
economies. Consider an economy that is subject to income shocks of different persistence
and its government looking to borrow short or long term. A persistent negative income
shock may eventually lead to a default, whereas a transitory shock is likelier to end with a
quick recovery. Immediately upon shock, investors are uncertain about the exact scenario
they see unfolding. What they are certain about is that this uncertainty will rapidly resolve
in favor of a persistent recession with low bond prices due to likely default or a transitory
recession with high bond prices due to quick recovery and the sovereign likely to remain
solvent. Therefore, uncertainty about the length of the recession makes long-term bonds
exhibit larger price risk, so that investors shift towards short-term debt which matures
before a lot of the uncertainty is resolved. In line with Broner et al. (2013), I argue that
emerging economies tend to borrow short-term during recessions because long-term bor-
rowing becomes relatively expensive. I attribute maturity-shortening to changes in supply
of loanable funds as well.3 However, my explanation of pro-cyclical debt maturity does
not rely on counter-cyclical investor risk-aversion; instead, the always-present uncertainty
about the persistence of income fluctuations and learning about it adds price risk to long-
term bonds and makes them costly to borrowers during recessions. Note that the cost of
borrowing stands for yield spread net of probability of default, or the risk premium that
the borrower expects to pay on debt.
The explanation that I provide, while intuitive, is also empirically plausible. Aguiar
and Gopinath (2004) document that emerging economies exhibit income dynamics with
a significant stochastic trend component. In a different work (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006),
the authors establish that accounting for such component can improve the empirical per-
formance of a dynamic stochastic model of a small open emerging economy with one-period
debt and strategic defaults; it creates counter-cyclical current account and interest rates.
Recessions generated by trend shocks are persistent and likely to lead to defaults; as a re-
3There is literature that attributes pro-cyclical debt maturity to changes on the demand side. For
example, Missale and Blanchard (1991) explain shorter maturity as a vehicle for the borrower to commit
against moral hazard attributable to long-term debt, especially during times of high debt-to-GDP ratio.
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sult, borrowing becomes more expensive (bond price falls), so the current account increases.
I argue that one more salient feature of a dynamic model with stochastic trend component
is that, when coupled with imperfect information and learning about the source of income
fluctuations, it can potentially generate empirically plausible pro-cyclical debt maturity.
An interesting implication for the borrowing developed economies is that they should have
a less pro-cyclical sovereign debt maturity because their national incomes exhibit rela-
tively small trend components (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004). I discuss this implication in
section 3.3.
The goal of this work is to establish the key factors that shorten the equilibrium debt
maturity at the onset of a recession and show that uncertainty about the persistence of
the recession is one of these factors. To achieve this goal, I develop a simple three-period
model of an emerging economy that is born in a recession of uncertain length with a large
debt to restructure. In line with Broner et al. (2013), the model shows that equilibrium
debt maturity is the outcome of risk-sharing between a policymaker that seeks to smooth
the economy’s consumption path and risk-averse investors that purchase short- and long-
term bonds and price them according to the expected payments they deliver in different
states of the world upon maturity. A higher investors’ risk-aversion or a lower borrower’s
risk-aversion result in a shorter debt maturity. Most importantly, the model is able to
demonstrate that uncertainty about the type of recession shortens the debt maturity in
equilibrium, compared to the case of no uncertainty. In addition, when there is uncertainty,
if the long-recession scenario corresponds to a more persistent income shock, or if this
scenario is believed to be likely, the debt maturity is shorter in equilibrium. Finally, the
model shows that a high initial debt (that is, likely default) at the onset of a recession is
required for the maturity to shorten.
In what follows, section 3.2 describes the model; section 3.3 delivers the results and
develops the intuition; section 3.4 discusses applications and concludes.
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3.2 Model
Consider an economy that generates a random national income available for consumption
in every period. The income can be either high or low, and a benevolent policymaker,
the risk-averse government, has a concave utility function over the aggregate consumption,
and wishes to smooth consumption path. To do so, the government can borrow from risk-
averse international investors. By issuing Di bonds, the government promises to pay Di
units of consumption good in the period when these bonds mature. The economy is born
in period 0 with a low income and an outstanding debt D0 payable immediately; it lives
for three periods and dies after period 2. In order to restructure its debt in period 0, the
government can borrow DL0 long-term bonds that mature in period 2 and DS0 short-term
bonds that mature in period 1. In period 1, the government cannot default; it has to repay
the short-term debt DS0, and it can issue DS1 short-term bonds that mature in period 2.
In period 2, the government can either repay the outstanding debt DS1 +DL0 and consume
the remaining income, or default on the debt and pay a fraction µ of national income as a
cost of default. The risk-averse investors price the bonds consistently with their stochastic
discount factor, the policymaker’s optimal decision to default in the last period, and the
likelihood of state of default.
3.2.1 Income Process
The income process replicates the onset of a recession of uncertain persistence. Agents
know that income is a two-state Markov chain: yt ∈ {yL, yH}. The economy is born in
period 0 with low income: y0 = yL < yH . It is not known what transition matrix Pi defines
the income dynamics. In particular, agents believe that with probability p, income is a
persistent process with transition matrix P1 and with probability 1−p, income is a volatile
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process with transition matrix P2, such that
P1 =
1− s/2 s/2
s/2 1− s/2
 ; P2 =
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
 ,
where s ∈ [0, 1). Let l0 be the probability (estimated at period 0) that income in period 1
is low:
l0 = Pr 0(y1 = yL) = (1 + p− sp)/2. (3.1)
Naturally, l0 is higher for higher p or lower s. Agents will use the information about the
state of income in period 1 to learn about the likelihood of each of the transition matrices
that compete to describe the income process. Low income in period 1 will make agents
update their belief in favor of the persistent income process, and high income will make
the transitory income process a likelier scenario. The probability of low income in period
2 estimated in period 1, therefore, depends on the state of income. For each of the two
states of income in period 1, it is computed using the Bayes rule:
lL = Pr 1(y2 = yL|y1 = yL) = 12
p(2− s)2 + 1− p
1 + p− sp ; (3.2)
lH = Pr 1(y2 = yL|y1 = yH) = 12
ps2 + 1− p
1− p+ sp . (3.3)
The diagram below summarizes the possible paths of income process and the likelihood of
each of the paths estimated by the agents.
•
yL
•
yL
•
yL, possible default
•
yH
•
yH
l0 //
1−l0
::
lL //
1−lL
::1−lH
//
lH
$$
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
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Note that forecast income dynamics between the two states are summarized by two
parameters, p and s. Parameter p defines the initial likelihood of the persistent Markov
chain, and parameter s defines the degree to which it is persistent, with s close to zero
standing for high persistence. This is a counterpart of an infinite-horizon set-up in which
income is driven by two components, transitory and persistent shock processes, while agents
can only observe the aggregate income and implement Kalman filtering to distinguish
between the sources of income dynamics. In such set-up, the Kalman gain, or the degree
to which the agents will be prone to interpret the changes in income as driven by the
persistent component, depends on the volatility of the persistent component relative to the
transitory one (signal-to-noise ratio) and on the persistence of the persistent component.
For example, when the income is hit by a negative shock, the former tells how likely the
shock is to be persistent immediately upon shock, and the latter tells how quickly the
agents will learn that the shock is persistent if the income stays low. Parameters p and s
in my model work in exactly the same manner.
3.2.2 Bond Prices
The government can issue bonds and sell them to risk-averse investors. At period 0, the
government can sell both short- and long-term bonds, which mature in periods 1 and 2,
respectively. At period 1, the government can only issue short-term, one-period bonds.
For simplicity, assume the government cannot save or buy back the long-term bonds in
period 1.4 Also, as it is explained below, default can occur in equilibrium only after the
low-income state in period 1. Therefore, credit risk is an issue only when the income
remains low in period 1, which is one reason why the long-term bonds are subject to price
risk. Another reason is that bond prices depend on the behavior of the stochastic discount
4Broner et al. (2013) report that borrowing governments almost never buy back the long-term bonds.
Saving in period 0 is not optimal due to a large outstanding debt. Saving in period 1 is restricted for
simplicity; this restriction partially impedes optimal consumption-smoothing, but does not distort the
qualitative results of the model—see section 3.3.
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factor, or pricing kernel, mt attributable to investors:
mt = exp(−α ln yt − γ ln xt + c), (3.4)
where yt is the economy’s income, c is a constant, and xt is a log-normally distributed
random variable: ln xt ∼ N(0, σ2).5 Parameter α defines the degree to which the pricing
kernel mt is correlated with the economy’s income. Assumably, the markets for public
debt are segmented, and investors are specialized in given economy so that a significant
portion of their wealth is invested in the economy and not diversified. Another reason
for correlation could be that the economy’s income can be subject to systemic shocks,
such as global business cycles.6 The unconditional expectation of the pricing kernel is the
following:
E[m] = E[y−α]E[e−γ lnx+c] =
(
l¯y−αL +
(
1− l¯)y−αH ) eγ2σ2/2+c,
where l¯ is the unconditional probability of low-income state. Given that both transition
matrices P1 and P2 are symmetric, it is safe to say that l¯ = 1/2. Parameter c is calibrated
so that the unconditional expectation of the pricing kernel corresponds to a constant risk-
free rate r, which I calibrate and which corresponds to a risk-free asset unavailable to
investors:
c = −γ2σ2/2− ln
((
y−αL + y
−α
H
)
/2
)
− ln(1 + r) ⇒ E[m] = 11 + r .
Given the pricing kernel, standard derivations based on the Euler equation for investors
imply that a zero-coupon, short-term (or one-period) bond that promises one unit of con-
5Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) discuss a similar kernel.
6In an infinite-horizon dynamic framework, the latter explanation is less favored, since incomes in emerg-
ing economies show substantial trend components, unlike in developed economies. Therefore, the latter
explanation is less favored, since income fluctuations should not be synchronized across different types of
economies.
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sumption good in period t+ 1 has the following price in period t:
qSt = Et[mt+1χt+1],
where χt is the indicator function that equals one whenever the government decides to
repay the debt and zero whenever the government defaults. This simple formulation relies
on the assumption that investors cannot recover any fraction of the government debt in case
of default.7 Also, by construction, the government can only default in period 2. Therefore,
χ1 = 1, and the one-period bond issued in period 0 has the following price:
qS0 =
1
1 + r
l0y
−α
L + (1− l0)y−αH
l¯y−αL +
(
1− l¯)y−αH . (3.5)
The term l¯y−αL +
(
1 − l¯)y−αH stands for the unconditional expectation of income. Intu-
itively, because α > 0, if the low-income state in the next period is likely, the bond price is
higher. This is because the short-term bond promises a non-contingent payment in period
1, whereas investors are affected by the state of the economy (e.g., due to lack of diversi-
fication, they may suffer losses in wealth and consumption when the economy experiences
a low aggregate income).
In period 1, the price of a short-term bond depends on the state of income and on the
government’s policy which defines whether the default is likely. If the policy is such that
default will never happen in period 2, the bond is called ”safe” and its price is denoted by
q¯Si, where i ∈ {L,H} denotes the state of income in period 1. If the government policy
makes default in period 2 likely, the bonds are called ”risky”, and the first-period price of
a short-term bond is labeled q˜Si, i ∈ {L,H}. The only feasible outcome of the model is
that default, if likely at all, occurs only when the last-period income is low. The reason
is provided in section 3.2.3 below. In short, excessive borrowing that makes default in the
7Yue (2010) finds that a model with strategic defaults that includes endogenous debt renegotiation and
partial debt recovery can have a better empirical performance (e.g., have higher equilibrium debt-to-GDP
ratio and default rate).
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last period certain is pointless because the corresponding bond price is zero; also, it is never
optimal to prefer default in case of high income and repayment in case of low income in
period 2.
It is intuitive to rewrite the equilibrium price of a short-term bond in period 1 using
the covariance between the indicator for debt repayment and the pricing kernel:
qSi = Ei[m2]Ei[χ2] + Covi(m2, χ2), i ∈ {L,H}.
Clearly, foreign lenders are willing to pay more for bonds if they expect the income to be
low at the time of repayment, and less if the government is expected to default in low-
income states. If the bonds are safe, the covariance term is zero, because χ2 = 1, and the
price is
q¯Si =
1
1 + r
liy
−α
L + (1− li)y−αH
l¯y−αL +
(
1− l¯ )y−αH , i ∈ {L,H}. (3.6)
If the bonds are risky, the indicator χ2 is perfectly correlated with income, and the price is
q˜Si =
1
1 + r
(1− li)y−αH
l¯y−αL +
(
1− l¯ )y−αH , i ∈ {L,H}. (3.7)
The price of risky bonds reflects the value of the payment that investors will receive only
in case of high income in period 2.
What about the price of the long-term bonds issued in period 0? The straightforward
way is to combine equations (3.6) and (3.7) with the following recursion
qL0 = E0[m1m2χ2] = E0[m1qS1]. (3.8)
Given the amount of borrowing {DL0, DS0} in period 0, lenders can predict the government
policy for every state of the world in periods 1 and 2 and price the long-term bonds
consistently with the policymaker’s optimal decision to default or repay in the terminal
period.
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3.2.3 Policymaker’s Problem
In each of the three periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the policymaker acts benevolently to maximize
the expected lifetime utility function derived from a representative agent’s consumption:
Ut =
2−t∑
i=0
βiEt
[
u(ct+i)
]
. (3.9)
I assume a concave instant utility function u(c), so that the borrower is risk-averse. Let us
consider the three periods consecutively.
3.2.3.1 Initial Period
The economy is born in period t = 0 with low income yL and a debt D0 payable immedi-
ately. The government cannot default in period 0, so that χ0 = 1. It chooses the optimal
amounts of long- and short-term debt {DL0, DS0} in order to maximize the utility function
(3.9). All the debt is restricted to be non-negative: Dj ≥ 0.8 The value function in period 0
is the following:
V0(yL, D0) = max
DL0,DS0
u(c0) + βE0
[
V1(y1, DL0, DS0)
]
. (3.10)
The budget constraint in period 0 bounds consumption c0 by national income net of debt
payment D0 plus the amount of funds provided by the foreign lenders for the newly issued
bonds:
c0 ≤ yL −D0 + qS0DS0 + qL0DL0. (3.11)
Note that the government can commit to debt repayment in the future only if it is the
optimal policy; lenders can predict the outcome for any debt combination {DL0, DS0} in
any future state of the world and set the prices qL0(DL0, DS0) and qS0(DL0, DS0) according
8As mentioned above, it partially impedes consumption-smoothing in period 1, because saving in high-
income state in period 1 may be optimal, but does not affect the qualitative results of the model. As
for period 0, given the scope of outstanding debt D0 and low income, it is optimal for the government to
restructure the debt and remain a net borrower.
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to equations (3.5)–(3.8).
3.2.3.2 Intermediate period
The economy enters period 1 with a debt combination {DL0, DS0}, and the state of income
y1 is revealed. The agents update their beliefs about the probabilities of income states in
the terminal period summarized by variable l1 ∈ {lL, lH}, as described by equations (3.2)
and (3.3). Default is not an option (χ1 = 1); the policymaker repays the short-term debt
DS0 and issues an additional amount of short-term bonds DS1 that mature in the terminal
period in order to maximize the utility function (3.9), which gives the following definition
of the value function for period 1:
V1(y1, DL0, DS0) = max
DS1
u(c1) + βE1
[
V2(y2, DL0, DS1)
]
. (3.12)
The budget constraint is similar to (3.11):
c1 ≤ y1 −DS0 + qS1DS1. (3.13)
Again, the bond price qS1 defined by equations (3.6) and (3.7) is consistent with the
policymaker’s optimal decision to default in period 2 given the outstanding debt DL0+DS1.
3.2.3.3 Terminal period
The policymaker enters period 2 with an outstanding debt DL0 +DS1, and the income y2
is revealed. It is the last period and there is no additional borrowing; it is the only period
when default is possible. If there is no default (χ2 = 1), the last-period consumption equals
national income net of the repaid debt. In case of default (χ2 = 0), nothing is paid to the
lenders, and the economy loses a fraction µ of its income. The value function is therefore
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the following:
V2(y2, DL0, DS1) = max
χ2∈{0,1}
u
(
χ2 ×
(
y2 −DL0 −DS1
)
+ (1− χ2)× y2(1− µ)
)
. (3.14)
One possible justification for the loss of a fraction of output in case of default is that trade
sanctions may follow the default: Rose (2005) documents declines in international trade
after sovereign defaults. Arellano (2008) argues that a sovereign default disrupts the supply
of credit from the private financial sector, an essential factor of domestic output. Finally,
a loss in output due to default is a necessary addition to make the punishment for default
severe enough for the equilibrium amount of debt to be reasonably large, as pointed out
by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
3.2.4 Optimal Policy
I use backward induction to solve for the optimal policy. Since there is no closed-form
solution, I combine analysis with numerical optimization.
3.2.4.1 Period 2
In the last period, the policymaker will simply decide whether to default or not and con-
sume the entire income net of costs associated with debt. Equation (3.14) tells that the
government will default if the cost of debt repayment exceeds the cost of default: χ2 = 0
if DL0 +DS1 > µy2. Given that yH > yL, it is impossible to have a total debt payable in
period 2 such that it is optimal to repay in case of low income and renege on debt in case
of high income.
3.2.4.2 Period 1
Because of the interaction between the chosen amount of short-term debt DS1 and its
price qS1, the value function V1(·) defined by equation (3.12) is not so straightforward
to find. To assess the properties of V1(y1, DL0, DS0), let us restrict its state-space S =
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{yL, yH} × R+ × R+ to a domain SR that can be considered as the result of optimal
behavior in period 0. The value function V1(·) can be defined, first, if the short-term bond
price qS1 is consistent with the chance of default given the amount of debt to be repaid
in the last period; and second, if consumption in period 1 is non-negative. Regarding the
chance of terminal-period default and the corresponding bond price, equation (3.14) tells
that there are three possibilities. First, if DL0 + DS1 > µyH , the total debt payable in
the last period is too high and the government is certain to default, so the bond price in
period 1 is zero. Second, if DL0 + DS1 ≤ µyL, the debt is too small and the government
will always repay in period 2, so the bond price is q¯S1 (defined by equation (3.6)). Finally,
if µyL < DL0 +DS1 ≤ µyH , the government will prefer default only in case of low income
in the last period, and the corresponding bond price is q˜S1 (equation (3.7)). Each of
these three cases is possible for a different subset of state-space S and must be considered
separately.
Let SAy1 be the set of pairs (DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+ for which, given first-period income y1,
there exists a choice of first-period short-term borrowing DS1 ∈ R+ such that first-period
consumption is non-negative and the debt payable in the last period is so high that the
government is guaranteed to default (so that the bond price qS1 is zero).9 Using (3.13)
and (3.14),
SAy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ y1 −DS0 ≥ 0 and DL0 +DS1 > µyH , for some DS1 ∈ R+},
which can be simplified to become
SAy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ DS0 ≤ y1}. (3.15)
That is, if the sovereign can repay the debt DS0 out of national income, it can afford to
issue so many new bonds that they guarantee default in the last period and their price is
9The superscripts stand for the likelihood of default in the last period: ”Always”, ”Never”, ”Sometimes”.
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zero.
Similarly, let SNy1 contain points (DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+ for which, given first-period in-
come y1, there is a value DS1 ∈ R+ small enough so that the government will never default
in period 2, but at the same time large enough so that consumption is non-negative in
period 1. Using (3.13) and (3.14),
SNy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ y1 −DS0 + q¯S1DS1 ≥ 0 and
DL0 +DS1 ≤ µyL, for some DS1 ∈ R+
}
,
which is simplified to become
SNy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ DL0 ≤ µyL and DS0 ≤ y1 + q¯S1(µyL −DL0)}. (3.16)
Finally, let SSy1 contain points (DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+ for which, given first-period income y1,
there is a value DS1 ∈ R+ that makes it optimal to default only in case of low income in
period 2 and allows for non-negative consumption in period 1:
SSy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ y1 −DS0 + q˜S1DS1 ≥ 0 and
µyL < DL0 +DS1 ≤ µyH , for some DS1 ∈ R+
}
,
which is simplified to become
SSy1 =
{
(DL0, DS0) ∈ R2+
∣∣ DL0 ≤ µyH and DS0 ≤ y1 + q˜S1(µyH −DL0)}. (3.17)
The value function V1(·) can be defined over the union of all subsets Siyj × {yj}, where
i ∈ {A,S,N} and j ∈ {L,H}. To further simplify the problem, note that optimal policy
will never lead to inadvertent default in the terminal period, because of the following two
results. First, given DL0 < µyH , the policymaker will never choose the amount of short-
term debt in period 1 so high that default is guaranteed in period 2: DL0+DS1 ≤ µyH . And
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second, the policymaker will never choose the amount of long-term debt DL0 in period 0
so high that default is guaranteed in period 2: DL0 ≤ µyH . To prove the first result, notice
that setting the short-term debt in period 1 too high (DS1 > µyH − DL0) makes default
unavoidable, so the lenders will assign zero price to such debt. Such debt does not increase
consumption in period 1 but guarantees that the economy will incur the cost of default
in period 2. There is always a better policy. For an example, given DL0 < µyH , if the
policymaker sets DS1 = (µyH − DL0)/2, the outright gain in period 1 is qS1DS1 (where
qS1 is positive because the debt is likely to be repaid), and the cost of debt repayment
DS1 +DL0 in period 2 is less than the cost of default µyH , at least in case of high-income
state. A similar argument proves the second statement. The long-term debt will be less
than µyH : it can be sold at a positive price qL0 and increase consumption in period 0; also,
given the first result, it allows to increase consumption in period 1 by issuing short-term
debt DS1 at a positive price qS1; and finally, the cost of debt repayment DL0 + DS1 will
be less than the cost of default in period 2, at least in case of high-income state.
For the purposes of finding the optimal policy, the two results allow to restrict the
domain of the value function V1(·) to SR =
{
Siyj × yj
∣∣ i ∈ {S,N}, j ∈ {L,H}}. Over this
domain, the value function can be found as follows. Let V S1 (·) be the first-period value
function consistent with default that happens in case of low-income state in period 2:
V S1 (y1, DL0, DS0) = max
DS1
u(c1) + βE
[
V2(y2, DL0, DS1)
]
s.t. c1 ≤ y1 −DS0 + q˜S1DS1;
µyL < DL0 +DS1 ≤ µyH .
Similarly, the value function V N1 (·) is consistent with the choice of DS1 small enough so
that the government will never default:
V N1 (y1, DL0, DS0) = max
DS1
u(c1) + βE
[
V2(y2, DL0, DS1)
]
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s.t. c1 ≤ y1 −DS0 + q¯S1DS1;
DS1 +DL0 ≤ µyL.
Given these definitions, the value function (3.12) can be expressed as
V1(y1, DL0, DS0) =

V N1 (y1, DL0, DS0), if (DL0, DS0) ∈ SNy1 \ SSy1 ;
V S1 (y1, DL0, DS0), if (DL0, DS0) ∈ SSy1 \ SNy1 ;
max
{
V N1 (y1, DL0, DS0), V S1 (y1, DL0DS0)
}
,
if (DL0, DS0) ∈ SNy1 ∩ SSy1 .
(3.18)
The provided formulation tells how to numerically estimate the value function V1(·).
Figure 3.1 schematically summarizes the results of numerical evaluation for a given in-
come y1 (the results are essentially the same for low and high income). Area ODEF repre-
sents the subset SNy1 compatible with zero chance of default in the last period; area OABC
corresponds to the subset SSy1 compatible with likely default. Notice that defaultable debt,
when it becomes available, expands the set of choices for the government towards greater
debt: in the figure, area OABC expands the domain of the value function. Shaded area
represents the states where large debt DL0 +DS1 and likely default is the optimal policy;
white area stands for the points where smaller debt with zero chance of default is preferred.
Notice that the latter is bounded by a downward-sloping line DGF : quite intuitively, a
large current debt may trigger an optimal policy that makes default likely in the future.
Finally, note that the value functions V N1 (·) and V S1 (·) are continuous and differentiable
over their respective domains SNy1 and S
S
y1 . Because V1(·) is a maximum of the two values
supplied by V N1 (·) and V S1 (·), it is continuous but not differentiable (along the line GF in
figure 3.1), which complicates the numerical optimization.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the typical shape of the first-period value function V1(·) pa-
rameterized and plotted for a given y1. For illustrative purposes, I have evaluated the
function over all the points where it can be defined; notice however, that the restricted
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A(0, y1 + q˜S1µyH)
B(µyH , y1)
C(µyH , 0)
D(0, y1 + q¯S1 µ yL)
E(µyL, y1)
F (µyL, 0)
G
(
q¯S1 µyL−q˜S1 µyH
q¯S1−q˜S1 , y1 +
q˜S1q¯S1
q¯S1−q˜S1µ(yH − yL)
)
DS0
DL0O
Figure 3.1: Domain SRy1 of the first-period value function V1(·) for a given income y1. Area
ODEF is the set of points compatible with additional borrowing in period 1 so little that
default in period 2 is impossible; area OABC is the set of points where the policymaker
can make default in period 2 likely in case of low income. Shaded area represents the points
where the latter option is optimal.
domain SRy1 only includes the points that can correspond to a likely debt repayment in
the last period (DL0 ≤ µyH).10 Naturally, the value function is non-increasing in both
short-term and long-term debt, since the sovereign incurs nothing but costs of debt after
the period when the debt is issued. It is clear from the figure that the value function is
more sensitive to short-term than long-term debt. By construction, short-term debt DS0
cannot be repudiated; it is a non-contingent payment that directly affects consumption in
period 1. High short-term debt DS0 eventually drives the first-period consumption to zero
and the value function V1(·) to negative infinity. As for long-term debt, it can be repudiated
in the last period, so its impact on consumption path and on the value function is limited.
What prevents the policymaker from borrowing an infinite long-term debt and enjoying
10The value function V1(·) can be defined and is finite for any level of DL0 ≥ 0 as long as DS0 < y1. Any
such state is a part of subset SAy1 that corresponds to the points compatible with a policy that makes default
in period 2 certain. I have excluded this subset from the domain of the value function as sub-optimal.
74
infinite consumption in period 0 is the fact that lenders would price such irrecoverable debt
accordingly. Therefore, in period 0, whether the policymaker finds it optimal to borrow
long-term so extensively that default becomes likely depends on the supply of debt.
0
DS0
µyH
DL0
Figure 3.2: Parameterized and numerically evaluated value function V1(y1, DL0, DS0).
Lighter shade stands for higher value, white area stands for points where it is undefined.
The restricted domain SRy1 is the set of points for which the value function is defined, with
the exception of points that are only compatible with certain default; SRy1 is represented
by the shaded area to the left from the dashed line.
3.2.4.3 Period 0
The policymaker must decide upon the optimal debt combination {D∗L0, D∗S0} that maxi-
mizes the value function V0(·) defined by equation (3.10). The choices {DL0, DS0} that can
be considered as candidates for optimal policy must be elements of (SNyL∪SSyL)∩(SNyH∪SSyH ),
where sets SNy1 and S
S
y1 are defined by equations (3.16) and (3.17). In other words, the pol-
icy chosen in the initial period must be such that it falls within the restricted state domain
of the value function V1(·) for any first-period income y1, high or low. Let us define a
combination {DL0, DS0} as feasible if it satisfies this condition, as well as the budget con-
straint (3.11). Like in the first period, there is interaction between bond prices. On the
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one hand, given that a policy is feasible, it does not have impact on the short-term bond
price qS0, because the short-term debt that matures in period 1 is assumed to be repaid
and the likelihood of high or low income in period 1 is exogenous. On the other hand,
a policy {DL0, DS0} chosen in period 0 defines whether default in period 2 is likely after
the economy experiences high or low income in period 1; the bond price qL0 must reflect
this fact. This interaction complicates the search for the global maximum of the value
function V0(·).
However, I find it sufficient for illustrative purposes to evaluate the value function V0(·)
for all the feasible values of long-term debt DL0 and their corresponding feasible choices
of short-term debt D∗S0
∣∣DL0 that maximize the value function V1(·) given fixed DL0. As
equations (3.11), (3.16), and (3.17) suggest, it is possible to find a feasible pair {DL0, DS0}
only for DL0 ∈ [0, µyH ], as long as the initial debt D0 is not too large. For a given value
DL0, the computational strategy to find V0(·) is the following:
1. Find the price of the short-term debt, qS0.
2. Given DL0, use numerically estimated V1(·) and its definition (3.18) to find the ranges
of DS0 that are compatible with the following four cases of likelihood of default:
(a) default is never likely:
V1(yL, DL0, DS0) = V N1 (yL, DL0, DS0), V1(yH , DL0, DS0) = V N1 (yH , DL0, DS0);
(b) default is likely only after the first period with low income:
V1(yL, DL0, DS0) = V S1 (yL, DL0, DS0), V1(yH , DL0, DS0) = V N1 (yH , DL0, DS0);
(c) default is likely only after the first period with high income:
V1(yL, DL0, DS0) = V N1 (yL, DL0, DS0), V1(yH , DL0, DS0) = V S1 (yH , DL0, DS0);
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(d) default is likely regardless of the first-period income:
V1(yL, DL0, DS0) = V S1 (yL, DL0, DS0), V1(yH , DL0, DS0) = V S1 (yH , DL0, DS0).
3. For all four cases, find the corresponding price qL0 using equations (3.6)–(3.8).
4. Find the value DS0 that maximizes the value function V0(·) in each of the four ranges.
5. Compare the four values of the value function to find the maximum; choose D∗S0
∣∣DL0,
the optimal short-term debt given DL0.
The following section delivers the results of the computational exercise.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Parameter Specification
Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values selected to represent the baseline case. The
time-preference parameter is set to be β = 0.95. I assume that the lenders have the same
patience as the policymaker, so that the risk-free rate is defined as r = 1/β − 1. I set
low income to be equal to only a third of high income: yH = 1; yL = 1/3. Such income
variability is quite dramatic. In an infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic model, one would
usually have to associate the default with an extremely large negative persistent income
shock (or a significant decline in trend), or a sequence of negative shocks. The whole point of
borrowing is to smooth consumption; if there is little income volatility, the sovereign would
never borrow so much that the default is likely, because it sharply diminishes the bond
prices and does not help smooth the path of consumption. The need to have a possibility
of default combined with the lack of horizon in a model with three periods justifies my
choice of income variability. In addition to creating the possibility of default, such volatile
income process helps study the impact of lenders’ and policymaker’s risk-aversion. High
risk-aversion puts more value to smooth consumption path on the policymaker’s side and
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Table 3.1: Parameter values of the baseline model
Parameter Value Meaning
β 0.95 Policymaker’s discount factor
yH 1.0 High income
yL 0.33 Low income
µ 0.33 Cost of default
η 1.0 Risk-aversion coefficient of the policymaker
α 0.5 Sensitivity of lenders’ stochastic discount factor to income
s 0.04 Persistence of the persistent income process
p 0.04 Prior likelihood of the persistent income process
D0 0.5 Initial debt
to larger payments during low-income states on the lenders’ side; both of these features
are harder to maintain when income fluctuates dramatically. Therefore, equilibrium is
more sensitive to risk-aversion coefficients when income is volatile.11 The cost of default,
measured as a fraction of default-state income, is set to be µ = 1/3. This cost is set
high enough so that there is significant amount of debt maturing in period 2 that can be
credible. A low value of parameter µ would make a commitment to repay any significant
amount of long-term debt non-credible, whereas the most interesting characteristic of the
equilibrium is the maturity of debt issued in the initial period.
All the remaining parameter values are specific only to the baseline case; their impact
on the equilibrium is subject to scrutiny. The policymaker has a CRRA utility function
u(c) = c1−η/(1 − η) and the risk-aversion coefficient η is equal to one, so that the utility
function is logarithmic in the baseline case. Parameter α defines the dependence of lenders’
stochastic discount factor on the economy’s income. When α = 0, the lenders are neutral
to the risk specific to the borrowing economy: Et[mt+1 | yt] = 1/(1 + r). In this case, bond
prices simply correspond to the risk-free rate adjusted for chance of default. A higher
11At the same time, low income cannot be equal to zero, because it would create a chance of zero
consumption in the terminal period, which would make the specified utility function become infinite.
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value of α corresponds to greater risk-aversion and lower bond prices. I set α = 1/2 as
the baseline case. In the initial period, agents suspect that the income process may be
represented by a persistent Markov chain, and have a prior belief that this scenario is the
case with probability p. As a starting point, let p = 0.04; and let the parameter that
defines the persistence of the persistent Markov chain be s = 0.04, which, as described in
section 3.2.1, yields the following competing descriptions of the income process:
P1 =
0.98 0.02
0.02 0.98
 ; P2 =
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
 ,
where transition matrix P1 represents the persistent-income scenario. Finally, the debt
payable immediately in period 0 is set to be D0 = 1/2, which exceeds the income in the
initial period. By means of such high debt, the economy is put into a dire situation where
it cannot afford to repay the debt using its income and has to borrow extensively.
3.3.2 Results: Baseline Case
Figure 3.3 illustrates the optimal policy in the baseline case. It shows the optimal short-
term debt in the initial period for a given amount of long-term debt D∗S0
∣∣DL0, as well as
the corresponding value function. There are three lessons to be learned from these graphs.
First, the baseline-case optimal policy is for the policymaker to have zero long-term
debt. In equilibrium, the sovereign uses only the short-term debt to create consumption in
period 0 and then refinances depending on the state of income in period 1.
Second, it is clear that, for a larger fixed amount of long-term debt, the optimal policy
shifts towards a likelier default. As DL0 increases, non-zero chance of default becomes
either a preferred choice or the only option available. For example, consider the switch
from absolutely safe debt to the debt that will be defaulted if y0 = y1 = y2 = yL. As the
exogenous value of the long-term debt approaches the threshold between the two types of
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Value function V (·)∣∣DL0
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Figure 3.3: Initial-period value function and optimal short-term debt for a given long-term
debt DL0 ∈ [0, µyH ]. Lines marked with circles represent choices that never lead to default.
Asterisks mark choices that may lead to default if income remains low in all three periods.
Diamonds mark choices that will result in default whenever there is low income in the last
period, regardless of the state of income in the middle period.
debt, the sovereign prefers to cut the short-term debt sharply.12 Cutting short-term debt
in period 0 is a way to commit against additional borrowing in period 1, which keeps the
debt that matures in period 2 safe.13 The cut causes the consumption in period 0 and
the value function V0(·)|DL0 to fall dramatically, until the low-priced but extensive risky
debt becomes preferable. As for the transition from the debt that is defaulted only when
y0 = y1 = y2 = yL to the policy that leads to default whenever y2 = yL, it happens because
the latter becomes the only option for DL0 > µyL.
Finally, for a given likelihood of default, the relationship between a given long-term debt
DL0 and the corresponding optimal short-term debt D∗S0|DL0 is negative: when it comes
to financing immediate consumption, the bonds of different maturities are substitutes. A
12Figure 3.1 demonstrates why it is the case: the border between the safe and risky debt, indicated
by curve GF , is downward-sloping; when it is steep, in order to remain within the safe-debt region, the
policymaker eventually has to cut the short-term debt sharply when the long-term debt rises.
13Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) argue that short-term debt is generally cheaper to the borrower (it
has a lower yield, or higher price) precisely because the long-term debt suffers from lack of commitment:
there is always an incentive for additional borrowing before the long-term debt matures, which leads to
higher default risk.
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more interesting feature is the slope of the value function for a given likelihood of default.
Consider the region of default-free debt first: when the long-term debt is safe, its price is
high and it creates large gains to consumption in period 0. However, the value function
V0(·)|DL0 is the highest for small amounts of safe long-term debt. The main reason is that
safe long-term bonds require that the borrower makes non-contingent payments in the
terminal period. What changes when the long-term debt is not safe? First, the long-term
bond price qL0 is lower due to a positive chance of default; therefore, long-term bond adds
little to consumption in period 0 and to the value function V0(·)|DL0. However, as figure
3.3 clearly indicates, the policymaker can actually benefit from increasing the scope of
long-term borrowing in case when the long-term debt is risky (at least in case when default
occurs if y0 = y1 = y2 = yL). The reason is that, while more long-term debt is associated
with greater consumption in period 0, its impact on the cost of debt is limited because
the government does not repay the debt in case of low income in the last period. For the
case when default occurs whenever the last-period income is low (y2 = yL), the price of
long-term debt is too low for the government to benefit from its expansion. Actually, this
level of default risk is never an equilibrium outcome; this result holds for all calibrations
studied below.
It is necessary to make a remark regarding the simplifying assumption that the gov-
ernment cannot save (Di ≥ 0). This assumption puts long-term borrowing in conflict with
consumption-smoothing and therefore makes it less attractive. Long-term debt decreases
consumption in the last period, when the long-term debt is to be repaid. In the inter-
mediate period, it shifts the optimal policy towards saving, which is not an option by
assumption. In this respect, having more short-term debt DS0 may be better because it is
repaid in period 1, and the policymaker can rely on additional borrowing DS1 to smooth
consumption. This is especially important in the case when the debt is safe, and less so
when the government defaults in low-income state. Effectively, this assumption shifts the
optimal policy towards short-term borrowing in the initial period. However, the main pur-
pose of the model is to determine the factors that are important for the choice of debt
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maturity, and the no-saving assumption does not qualitatively affect the analysis provided
below. The benefit of this assumption is that it simplifies the solution.
3.3.3 Lessons from the Model
3.3.3.1 Does Learning Matter?
The central question is, of course, whether uncertainty about the persistence of income
process and Bayesian learning matter for the optimal debt maturity in equilibrium. To
answer this question, I solve the model for the baseline parameter specification but in an
alternative setting where Bayesian updating does not happen. Instead, the initial prior
describes the estimated probabilities of future income states both in period 0 and period 1:
equations (3.2) and (3.3) are replaced with lL = l0 and lH = 1−l0. Figure 3.4 demonstrates
the results. Clearly, Bayesian updating tilts the policymaker’s preference towards shorter
maturity and safer bonds. In the top-left panel, the value function V0(·)|DL0 corresponding
to the baseline case with Bayesian learning is higher for the range of safe long-term debt
DL0, and lower for the range corresponding to likely default. In fact, numerical estimation
shows that in the baseline case, the optimal policy in equilibrium is zero long-term debt and
no chance of default, while in absence of Bayesian learning, there is substantial long-term
debt that is likely to be repudiated.
The top-right panel of figure 3.4 shows how Bayesian learning affects the updated prior
in period 1. Without learning, the state of income in the intermediate period does not
change the agents’ belief about the nature of the income process; agents stick to the prior
and believe that income in the second period will be low with probability l0 if income in
period 1 is low and with probability 1 − l0 if income in period 1 is high. With learning,
the state of income in the first period reveals additional information about the income
process. Namely, if income in period 1 is low, income process is likelier to be persistent
and remain low, so lL > l0. If income in period 1 is high, the income process is likelier to
be transitory and switch back to low income in period 2, so lH > 1− l0. Of course, if the
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Figure 3.4: Bayesian learning tilts the optimal policy towards less long-term debt and a less
likely default. Bayesian learning [1] decreases the value function for policies associated with
likely default and increases it for policies corresponding to default-free debt (top left); [2]
makes agents update their beliefs in period 1 so that low income in period 2 is likelier (top
right); [3] makes prices for short-term safe bonds q¯S1 higher and price for risky bonds q˜S1
lower in period 1 (bottom left); and [4] increases the wedge between the price for long-term
safe bonds q¯L0 and the price for long-term risky bonds q˜L0 in period 0 (bottom right).
agents are initially absolutely certain that the income process is persistent or transitory
(i.e., p = 1 or p = 0), the prior is not updated in period 1, which is equivalent to no
learning. In short, Bayesian learning increases the estimated likelihood of the low-income
state in period 2 regardless of the state of income in period 1. This, in turn, makes
short-term debt preferable in period 0, by means of bond prices assigned by lenders and
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consumption-smoothing executed by the borrower.
The two bottom panels of figure 3.4 indicate how learning affects the bond prices. By
assumption, investors are risk-averse; they put greater value on payments they receive
in low-income states. Because Bayesian updating increases the likelihood of low income
in the last period, it increases the price q¯S1 of safe short-term bonds that are issued in
period 1 and are not likely to lead to default. For the same reason, it decreases the price
q˜S1 of risky short-term debt that is only repaid in case of high income in the last period.
Also, Bayesian learning affects the long-term bond prices in period 0, which are simply
discounted expected short-term bond prices from period 1. As the bottom-right panel of
the figure shows, learning increases the wedge between the prices for safe and risky long-
term bonds. To sum up, Bayesian learning makes safe bonds relatively more expensive
(which corresponds to cheaper borrowing) than risky bonds.
As for the sovereign, commitment to repayment is possible if most of the deficit in the
initial period is financed by means of short-term bonds that mature in the intermediate
period. Consequently, in the intermediate period, the consumption-smoothing motive will
require that the policymaker refinances by issuing new short-term bonds. In presence
of learning, the policymaker can commit to debt repayment by keeping the total debt
maturing in the last period small enough and refinance more effectively in the intermediate
period by selling short-term safe bonds that will be relatively more expensive. On the other
hand, learning makes it problematic for the sovereign to use an extensive risky long-term
debt to finance consumption. First, risky long-term bonds are relatively cheaper due to
learning. And second, additional borrowing in the intermediate period, which is much
needed for a smooth consumption path in case of low income, becomes painful due to lower
price of new short-term risky bonds.
Intuitively speaking, when nobody is certain about the persistence of an unfolding
recession, two things happen. On the investors’ side, there is little desire to grant a large
long-term debt. On the upside, the recession is short and the economy will quickly recover
and repay the debt eventually. In the worst-case scenario, the recession is long and may
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eventually lead to a default. It is only with time that lenders can learn which scenario is the
case, so that uncertainty adds price risk to long-term bonds when default is a possibility.
Price risk is not a concern for short-term bonds, which mature early, before anyone believes
the economy may default. On the borrower’s side, additional price risk inherent to long-
term bonds simply makes it cheaper to shift towards short-term borrowing and subsequent
rollovers. As long as default is not an immediate concern, short-term borrowing will remain
cheaper even if the recession turns out to be persistent. The reason is that the lenders’
portfolio returns are correlated with the economy’s performance, so that lenders value
payments they receive in bad states of the economy. In line with the literature, the reason
for the maturity of sovereign debt to shorten during recessions is the supply-side shift that
makes short-term debt more accessible.14
Note that bond prices in the model can exceed unity for high values of p. This occurs
because investors do not have any alternative risk-free saving technology, such as cash under
the pillow. However, for the purposes of the qualitative analysis, it is sufficient to restrict
the range of p to a set of small values (up to 0.05), for which it is not a problem. Moreover,
despite the fact that the parameters of this simple model are not directly related to an
infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic case, it is worth noting that empirical estimations (such
as Aguiar and Gopinath (2004)) suggest that the persistent component of a typical income
process that describes an emerging economy’s GDP has a very small variance compared to
that of the transitory component. This means that any income shock is interpreted upon
its impact as very unlikely to be persistent.
Also, note that Bayesian learning may seem to have little impact on prices of bonds,
especially the long-term ones. Still, the effect on bond prices, combined with the prior
updated in favor of low income in the last period, is sufficient to have a definitive impact
on the optimal debt maturity in equilibrium. In addition, the degree to which learning
affects the bond prices depends on lenders’ risk-aversion, and its variations significantly
affect the equilibrium, as shown below.
14For example, see Broner et al. (2013).
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3.3.3.2 Sharing the Risk
Risk-aversion, both on the lenders’ and on the policymaker’s side, is important for the
optimal debt maturity in equilibrium. Parameter α measures the degree to which the
lenders’ stochastic discount factor is correlated with the economy’s income. According to
equation (3.4), if α = 0, lenders are not sensitive to the state of income of the borrowing
economy. A higher α makes lenders assign greater value to payoffs they receive in cases
when the borrowing economy exhibits low income. If the government debt is likely to
be repudiated, the payoffs from bonds are correlated with income. It is therefore safe to
say that parameter α measures the lenders’ aversion to risk associated with payoffs from
holding government bonds. So, risk-averse investors will dislike extensive long-term lending
that may lead to default; risky bonds will be priced accordingly, and in equilibrium, the
policymaker will find it preferable to rely more on short-term bonds. It is prices that
shift the optimal policy towards a sequence of short-term borrowing and a smaller chance
of default in the terminal period. This effect is reinforced by Bayesian learning, which
increases the updated likelihood of the low income in the last period: a likelier low-income
state makes default risk costly to the borrower, while safe bonds are relatively attractive.
Left panel of figure 3.5 demonstrates the effect of lenders’ risk-aversion on the outcome
of the model. Higher values of α increase the value function that corresponds to policies
involving little long-term debt and no chance of default in the terminal period. At the same
time, it decreases the prices of risky bonds, which causes the value function associated with
extensive long-term borrowing and likely default to drop. The result is that higher risk-
aversion on the lenders’ side moves the equilibrium in the initial period towards shorter
debt maturity.
Parameter η stands for the risk-aversion coefficient of the policymaker’s CRRA utility
function. It does not affect the bond prices, so it affects the optimal policy in the initial
period only to the degree to which different debt combinations differ in their ability to
smooth consumption. As the right panel of figure 3.5 reveals, a higher η makes the value
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Figure 3.5: Effect of lenders’ and policymaker’s risk-aversion on the optimal policy in the
equilibrium. More risk-averse investors will evade long-term bonds that are subject to
price risk, so that the equilibrium will shift towards shorter maturity (left panel). More
risk-averse policymaker will prefer long-term debt that can be repudiated (right panel).
function lower for policies involving absolutely no chance of default; at the same time,
given a non-zero chance of default, it makes the policymaker benefit more from expanding
the long-term borrowing. A more risk-averse government will be more eager to rely on
extensive long-term debt accompanied by a likely default in the terminal period. The
reason is, again, that the impact of a risky debt on the last-period consumption is limited;
there is always an option to renege on debt. Default protects the risk-averse policymaker
against cases of extremely low consumption.
These results are in line with Broner et al. (2013) who argue that the optimal maturity is
a result of a risk-sharing equilibrium: risk-averse lenders like short-term bonds because they
protect against credit and price risk; risk-averse government likes long maturity because it
allows for better consumption-smoothing. I also find that in presence of default risk, the
sovereign prefers to borrow long-term and default in low-income state in the last period.
Short-term debt has to be refinanced in the intermediate period, which is very costly if
the income in the middle period is low and it starts to look like the recession is persistent
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and default is a possibility. What is different in my model is that default is a strategic
decision, which is not necessarily likely in equilibrium.15 If lenders are more risk-averse,
they charge a large risk premium on defaultable long-term bonds and price the sovereign
out of extensive risky long-term borrowing. In this respect, the results are close to the
argument by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) that risk-averse investors prefer short-term
bonds because they can be used more efficiently to enforce the sovereign’s commitment to
repay the debt. In addition, I stress that uncertainty about the future of the economy in
a recession can add to risk premiums and shorten the equilibrium maturity of sovereign
debt.
3.3.3.3 Income Process
The initial period of the model represents an unfolding recession of an uncertain length,
with agents considering worst-case and best-case scenarios about the future of the economy.
The common knowledge is that if the economy borrows extensively and then suffers a long
recession, default will become a possibility. Intuitively, then, if the worst-case scenario is
a particularly long recession, and if this scenario is considered likely, the outcome is that
the government must have hard times procuring a large long-term debt. Figure 3.6 shows
that the model is in line with this intuition.
First, the optimal policy in equilibrium shifts towards short-term debt when the prior
belief is that a persistent income process is likely. The reason is that, for higher p, the
low-income state in the terminal period is likelier, so that a long-term debt so extensive
that it may be repudiated becomes very expensive to the borrower due to a lower price
q˜L0. At the same time, the price of safe long-term bonds q¯L0 becomes higher, since these
bonds pay off in a low-income state that is likelier. Note that the effect on the equilibrium
is dramatic even for small values of p. This suggests that, in an infinite-horizon dynamic
stochastic model, the presence of a trend component in the aggregate income process has
15Broner et al. (2013) focus on risky debt only; their model guarantees default in a low-income state in
the last period.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of persistence s and likelihood p of the persistent income process on the
optimal policy in the equilibrium. A likelier persistent income process makes it optimal
to borrow short-term (left panel). A more persistent income process makes it optimal to
borrow short term; s = 1 stands for the two competing descriptions of income process
being the same: P1(i, j) = P2(i, j) = 1/2 (right panel).
a large impact on the optimal debt maturity, even though its variance may be relatively
small (which seems to be the case even for emerging economies, as documented by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2004)).
Second, the equilibrium debt maturity is shorter when the worst-case scenario is a very
persistent income process. Setting s equal to 1 means that the persistent Markov chain
is described by the same transition matrix as the transitory one (P1 = P2), so that the
income process is certainly transitory. For s = 0, the persistent income process is described
by a unit transition matrix: P1 = I. If the transition matrix P1 has eigenvalues close to
one, the implication is that, if uncertainty about the nature of the income process resolves
in favor of the persistent process in period 1, the low-income state in the last period is
highly probable, which ultimately increases the chance of default in the last period for an
extensive long-term debt and adds price risk to long-term bonds.
These mechanics imply that uncertainty and learning have a potential to distinguish
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between the choices of debt maturity optimal for policymakers governing emerging and
high-income economies in distress. An emerging economy is more likely to experience per-
sistent shocks to aggregate income. Therefore, when a recession unfolds in such economy,
investors worry about a possible trend reversal and price long-term bonds accordingly.
The outcome is that emerging economies exhibit strongly pro-cyclical government debt
maturity, unlike high-income economies. The traditional assumption in the literature is
that developed economies do not default, implying that these economies should exhibit less
pro-cyclical variation in debt maturity. Historically, sovereign defaults have been limited
to emerging economies. However, the recent events have shown how small is the circle of
’safe-heaven’, default-free developed countries. During the Great Recession, many coun-
tries faced a sharp drop in sovereign credit ratings—Ireland, Spain, Portugal, to name a
few. Greece experienced a sovereign debt crisis. Many of the troubled countries were widely
considered as developed economies. At least in the investors’ eyes, default in a developed
economy seems to be possible. The introduced model can explain pro-cyclical variation of
debt maturity in an emerging economy and the lack of such in a developed economy by
differences between the typical income processes that describe these economies and that
are empirically documented in the literature.
3.3.3.4 Initial Debt
Figure 3.7 demonstrates the importance of the initial debt D0 with which the economy
is born. For a higher initial debt D0, the (normalized) value function V0(·)|DL0 becomes
more sensitive to the level of long-term debt DL0 over the region where long-term debt is
likely to be repudiated. Eventually, for D0 high enough, issuing a significant amount of
long-term debt subject to default risk becomes preferred over having only short-term debt
in the initial period and no chance of default in the last period. Notice that the amount of
debt D0 payable in the initial period for which extensive long-term borrowing and a likely
default become optimal is well in excess of that period’s income yL.
Essentially, higher initial debt reduces the funds available for consumption and effec-
90
Normalized V (·)∣∣DL0 and initial debt
 
 
−4.00
−3.95
−3.90
−3.85
−3.80
−3.75
−3.70
0 0.2 0.4µyHµyL
DL0
D0 = 0.4
D0 = 0.5 (baseline)
D0 = 0.6
Figure 3.7: Effect of initial debt D0 on the optimal policy in the equilibrium. A larger
initial debt makes it optimal to borrow long-term and face a likelihood of default.
tively makes the borrower more risk-averse. A more risk-averse borrower prefers extensive
long-term debt subject to default risk, as explained above. If the burden of debt is heavy,
paying the debt is particularly costly when income is low, so the sovereign accepts a pos-
sibility of default despite the risk premium it creates.
3.4 Final Remarks
3.4.1 Future Extensions
The model studies a scenario of a recession of uncertain persistence and establishes that
such uncertainty is capable of shortening the debt maturity. It is more so for an economy
where a persistent income process is particularly persistent or likely. These conclusions are
in line with the evidence from emerging economies, which are documented to exhibit short
debt maturity during recessions (Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2012; Broner et al., 2013)
and to have income processes with significant trend components, contrary to developed
economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004). As discussed in section 3.3.3.3, these results also
imply that a developed economy, if it is subject to default risk, should not experience
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such dramatic cuts in maturity during recessions, because its income process has a smaller
persistent component.
Hence, an interesting question is whether uncertainty and learning about the persistence
of income shocks can account for differences in dynamics of debt maturities of the two types
of economies once the assumption about default-free developed economies is relaxed. In
addition, it is interesting to investigate into the ability of learning to improve the empirical
performance of a model of a small open economy with endogenous maturity of debt.
Therefore, an infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic model that can be tested against
the data seems to be an interesting extension. However, endogenous treatment of debt
maturity requires a high-dimensional state vector, which complicates the solution of the
model.16 In addition, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that income process should
have two components of different persistence for uncertainty about the persistence of income
shocks to exist. The maturity structure of debt can be simplified down to two state
variables in order to account for it in a tractable manner; Hatchondo and Martinez (2009)
and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) design such simplifications. To keep the number of
continuous state variables low, the income state can be discretized using the algorithm
by Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The discretization is complicated due to the fact that
income process must be driven by two shock processes of different persistence and due to
uncertainty about the source of income fluctuations. A recent work by Judd et al. (2011)
shows a promising direction to take in order to solve a model with strategic default in a
high-dimensional set-up.
3.4.2 Conclusion
In line with the existing literature on sovereign debt maturity in emerging economies, the
model delivers intuitive results regarding the importance of risk-aversion on both sides of
the debt contract, the lack of credible commitment to repay inherent to long-term debt,
and the importance of the size of the outstanding debt. In addition, it accounts for the fact
16See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) for a discussion of the problem.
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that the sources of income dynamics may be of different persistence, introduces uncertainty
about such persistence, and delivers the following two key results. First, uncertainty about
the length of an unfolding recession embeds long-term bonds with additional risk and
effectively shortens the equilibrium maturity of the sovereign debt. And second, uncertainty
is more capable to shorten the debt maturity if it exists in presence of potentially very
persistent income shocks and if such shocks are likely.
Therefore, without the need to assume that there is no default risk in developed
economies, the provided theoretical framework can rely on typical features of income pro-
cesses in emerging and developed economies in order to create much more pro-cyclical
debt maturity in emerging economies. This idea requires further empirical investigation,
though.
Appendix A
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Model Solution
A.1.1 A Few Facts About the Default Threshold ω¯
For convenience, I provide several expressions related to G(ω¯) and Γ(ω¯) that are heavily
used to solve the model. Let Φ(·), φ(·), and h(·) be c.d.f., p.d.f., and hazard function
of the standard normal distribution. The variable ω is log-normally distributed: lnω ∼
N(−σ2/2, σ2). Define z = ln ω¯/σ+σ/2; it is straightforward to show that that φ(z−σ) =
ω¯φ(z) and ∂φ(z)/∂z = −zφ(z). Applying these facts to equations (1.2) and (1.3), I get
•G = Φ(z − σ)⇒ ∂G
∂ω¯
= G′ = φ(z)
σ
⇒ ∂G
′
∂ω¯
= −zφ(z)
ω¯σ2
;
• Γ = Φ(z − σ) + ω¯ (1− Φ(z))⇒ ∂Γ
∂ω¯
= Γ′ = 1− Φ(z)⇒ ∂Γ
′
∂ω¯
= −φ(z)
ω¯σ
It is straightforward to show that Γ′(ω¯t)−µG′(ω¯t) > 0 around the steady state by combining
the steady-state versions of equations A.6 and A.10.
A.1.2 De-trending
Let Ac,t denote the following measure of total productivity in consumption good sector:
Ac,t = Ay,tA
αy
1−αy
k,t . (A.1)
Then, consumption and most other variables are de-trended using Ac,t:
ct =
Ct
Ac,t
; cˆt =
Cˆt
Ac,t
; bt =
Bt
Ac,t
; sˆt =
Sˆt
Ac,t
;wt =
Wt
Ac,t
;xt =
Xt
Ac,t
;pit =
Πt
Ac,t
; kx,t =
Kx,t
Ac,t
.
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Note that consumption growth depends not only on technology specific to consumption
good production, but also on efficiency of capital creation in this sector. Capital stock in
consumption good sector is de-trended using Ac,tAk,t:
ky,t =
Ky,t
Ac,tAk,t
= Ky,t
Ay,tA
1
1−αy
k,t
.
When consumption-good capital productivity Ak,t is growing, the amount of consumption
good spent on Ky,t is growing slower than consumption along the balanced growth path.
Also, consumption-sector capital rent measured in units of consumption good also needs
to be de-trended: ry,t = Ry,tAk,t. Construction-sector capital is not affected by capital
productivity process, so its rent rx,t does not require de-trending.
Let Ah,t be the measure of total housing sector productivity. According to equation
(1.19), housing sector employs consumption good and construction capital that originate
from consumption good sector, along with labor that is subject to labor-augmenting pro-
ductivity Ax,t. Then, the total housing sector productivity depends on both Ac,t and Ax,t:
Ah,t = A
αxk+αxx
1−αxh
c,t A
1−αxk−αxx−αxh
1−αxh
x,t .
Correspondingly, all the housing stock variables are de-trended using Ah,t.
ht =
Ht
Ah,t
; hˆt =
Hˆt
Ah,t
; h¯t =
H¯t
Ah,t
; pt =
Ah,t
Ac,t
Pt.
Notice that the house price is de-trended using both consumption and housing sector
productivity. That is, if the consumption good sector expands faster, the house price
(measured in units of consumption goods per unit of housing stock) grows. In the end, all
three technology processes (Ay,t, Ak,t, and Ax,t) affect the evolution of house price.
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A.1.3 De-trended System
Savers
For savers, the de-trended versions of the budget constraint (1.7) and optimality conditions
(1.8)–(1.11) are:
cˆt + hˆtpt+sˆt + kˆy,t + kˆx,t =
1− δh
gh,t
hˆt−1ptΩt + wt + pˆit+
+1 + rm,t
gc,t
sˆt−1 +
rx,t + 1− δx
gc,t
kˆx,t−1 +
1 + ry,t − δy
gc,tgk,t
kˆy,t−1;
(A.2)
νt
cˆt
pt =
νtψt
hˆt
+ βˆEt
[
νt+1
cˆt+1
1− δh
gh,t+1
pt+1Ωt+1
]
(A.3)
νt
cˆt
= βˆEt
[
νt+1
cˆt+1
ry,t+1 + 1− δy
gk,t+1gc,t+1
]
(A.4)
νt
cˆt
= βˆEt
[
νt+1
cˆt+1
rx,t+1 + 1− δx
gc,t+1
]
(A.5)
νt
cˆt
= βˆEt
[
νt+1
cˆt+1
rm,t+1 + 1
gc,t+1
]
(A.6)
Borrowers
For borrowers, the de-trended versions of the constraints (1.12)–(1.14) and optimality con-
ditions (1.15)–(1.16) are:
ct + htpt − bt = 1− δh
gh,t
ht−1ptΩt(1− Γ(ω¯t)) + wt (A.7)
1 + rm,t = (1 + r¯m,t−1)
Γ(ω¯t)− µG(ω¯t)
ω¯t
(A.8)
ω¯t =
bt−1(1 + r¯m,t−1)gh,t
ht−1ptΩt(1− δh)gc,t (A.9)
βEt
[
νt+1
ct+1gc,t+1
ct
νt
Γ′(ω¯t+1)
]
= Et
[(
Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)
)
/(1 + rm,t+1)
]
(A.10)
νt
ct
pt =
νtψt
ht
+βEt
[
νt+1
ct+1
1− δh
gh,t+1
pt+1Ωt+1
(
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
)]
+
+νt
ct
Et
[
1− δh
gh,t+1
pt+1Ωt+1
(
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
)
/(1 + rm,t+1)
] (A.11)
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Instead of the saver’s participation constraint, equation (A.8) defines the ex-post return
on mortgage. The de-trended version of saver’s participation constraint (1.13) is defined
collectively by (A.6), (A.8), and (A.9).
Production
Equations (1.17)–(1.25), and Wx,t = Wy,t are combined and de-trended to get
wt = (1− αy)n−αyy,t
(
ky,t−1
gc,tgk,t
)αy
; (A.12)
ry,t = αyn1−αyy,t
(
ky,t−1
gc,tgk,t
)αy−1
; (A.13)
Ψht + (1−Ψ)hˆt − h¯t = n1−αxk−αxx−αxhx,t
(
kx,t−1
gc,t
)αxk
xαxxt h¯
αxh
t ; (A.14)
pit = n1−αxk−αxx−αxhx,t
(
kx,t−1
gc,t
)αxk
xαxxt h¯
αxh
t pt − wtnx,t − rx,t
kx,t−1
gc,t
− xt; (A.15)
pt =
xt
αxx
1
n1−αxk−αxx−αxhx,t
(
kx,t−1
gc,t
)αxk
xαxxt h¯
αxh
t
; (A.16)
wt =
1− αxk − αxx − αxh
αxx
xt
nx,t
; (A.17)
rx,t =
αxk
αxx
xtgc,t
kx,t−1
; (A.18)
h¯t =
1− δh
gh,t
(
Ψht + (1−Ψ)hˆt
)
Ωt. (A.19)
Market Clearing
Market-clearing conditions remain the same:
Ψbt = (1−Ψ)sˆt; (A.20)
(1−Ψ)kˆy,t = ky,t; (A.21)
(1−Ψ)kˆx,t = kx,t; (A.22)
(1−Ψ)pˆit = pit; (A.23)
nx,t + ny,t = 1. (A.24)
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Exogenous Processes
In the de-trended system, the levels of technology Ai,t do not matter; only the growth rates
gi,t are a part of state. To describe the three technologies (i ∈ {y, k, x}), equations (1.26)
and (1.27) are expressed in terms of the growth rates:
ln gi,t = γi,t + ui,t; (A.25)
γi,t = (1− ρi)γi + ρiγi,t−1 + vi,t. (A.26)
Equations (1.28)–(1.30) are not affected:
lnψt = ρψ lnψt−1 + (1− ρψ) lnψ + ψ,t; (A.27)
ln Ωt = ρΩ ln Ωt−1 + Ω,t; (A.28)
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + ν,t. (A.29)
Equations (A.2)–(A.29) are a closed stationary system that can be approximated around
the steady state. The steady state can be derived analytically; I omit the derivation of
steady state and provide the log-linearized system below.
A.1.4 Log-linearized System
The system (A.2)–(A.29) is re-combined, simplified, and log-linearized around the steady
state to obtain the following linear system, where variables with tilde stand for log-
deviations from the steady state:
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Savers
cˆ˜ˆct+kˆyk˜y,t + kˆxk˜x,t + sˆ˜ˆst + hˆp˜ˆht + hˆp
(
1− 1−δhgh
)
p˜t = ww˜t + pˆi ˜ˆpit+
+ kˆy
βˆ
(
k˜y,t−1 − g˜k,t − g˜c,t
)
+ kˆy
gkgc
ry r˜y,t +
kˆx
βˆ
(
k˜x,t−1 − g˜c,t
)
+ kˆx
gc
rxr˜x,t+
+ sˆ
βˆ
(˜ˆst−1 − g˜c,t)+ sˆ
gc
rmr˜m,t + hˆp1−δhgh
(˜ˆ
ht−1 + Ωt − g˜h,t
)
;
(A.30)
βˆ 1−δhgh Et
[
p˜t+1 + Ω˜t+1 − g˜h,t+1 − ˜ˆct+1 + ν˜t+1
]
= p˜t − ˜ˆct + βˆ 1−δhgh ν˜t +
ψcˆ
hˆp
(˜ˆ
ht − ψ˜t
)
; (A.31)
ν˜t − ˜ˆct = Et
[
ν˜t+1 − ˜ˆct+1 − g˜c,t+1 − g˜k,t+1 + ryry+1−δy r˜y,t+1
]
; (A.32)
ν˜t − ˜ˆct = Et
[
ν˜t+1 − ˜ˆct+1 − g˜c,t+1 + rxrx+1−δx r˜x,t+1
]
; (A.33)
ν˜t − ˜ˆct = Et
[
ν˜t+1 − ˜ˆct+1 − g˜c,t+1 + rmrm+1 r˜m,t+1
]
; (A.34)
Borrowers
cc˜t + hph˜t+hp
(
1− 1−δhgh (1− Γ)
)
p˜t − bb˜t =
=ww˜ + hp1−δhgh
(
(1− Γ)(h˜t−1 − g˜h,t + Ω˜t)− Γ′ω¯ ˜¯ωt
)
;
(A.35)
Et
[
c˜t+1 − ˜ˆct+1
]
− c˜t + ˜ˆct +
(
∂(Γ′ − µG′)
∂ω¯
ω¯
Γ′ − µG′ −
∂Γ′
∂ω¯
ω¯
Γ′
)
Et
[
ω¯t+1
]
= 0; (A.36)
p˜t =
ψc
hp
(
ψ˜t + c˜t − h˜t
)
+
+ 1−δhgh
(
βˆ(Γ− µG) + β(1− Γ))(Et [ν˜t+1 + p˜t+1 − gh,t+1 + Ω˜t+1]− ν˜t)+
+ βˆ 1−δhgh (Γ− µG)
(
˜ˆct − Et
[˜ˆct+1])+ β 1−δhgh (1− Γ)(c˜t − Et[c˜t+1]);
(A.37)
˜¯ωt = g˜h,t − g˜c,t + s˜t−1 − h˜t−1 − p˜t − Ω˜t + r¯mr¯m+1 ˜¯rm,t−1; (A.38)
rmr˜m = Γ−µGω¯ r¯m ˜¯rm,t−1 + (1 + r¯m)
(
Γ′ − µG′ − Γ−µGω¯
)
˜¯ωt; (A.39)
A.1.4.1 Production
w˜t = αy
(
k˜y,t−1 − g˜c,t − g˜k,t − n˜y,t
)
; (A.40)
r˜y,t = (1− αy)
(
n˜y,t + g˜c,t + g˜k,t − k˜y,t−1
)
; (A.41)
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Ψhph˜t + (1−Ψ)hˆp˜ˆht − h¯p˜¯ht =
=x1−αxk−αxx−αxhαxx n˜x,t + x
αxk
αxx
(
k˜x,t−1 − g˜c,t
)
+ xx˜t + xαxhαxx
˜¯ht;
(A.42)
p˜it = x˜t; (A.43)
p˜t = (1− αxx)x˜t − (1− αxk − αxx − αxh)n˜x,t − αxk
(
k˜x,t−1 − g˜c,t
)− αxh; (A.44)
w˜t = x˜t − n˜x,t; (A.45)
r˜x,t = x˜t + g˜c,t − k˜x,t−1; (A.46)
n˜y,t = −nxny n˜x,t; (A.47)
˜¯ht = ΨhΨh+(1−Ψ)hˆ h˜t−1 +
(1−Ψ)hˆ
Ψh+(1−Ψ)hˆ
˜ˆ
ht−1 + Ω˜t − g˜h,t; (A.48)
A.1.4.2 Exogenous Processes
g˜i,t = γ˜i,t + ui,t, i ∈ {y, k, x}; (A.49)
γ˜i,t = ρiγ˜i,t−1 + vi,t, i ∈ {y, k, x}; (A.50)
ψ˜t = ρψψ˜t−1 + ψ,t; (A.51)
Ω˜t = ρΩΩ˜t−1 + Ω,t; (A.52)
ν˜t = ρν ν˜t−1 + ν,t. (A.53)
A.1.5 Steady-State Kalman Filter
Recall equations (1.34) and (1.35):
g˜i,t = γ˜i,t + ui,t;
γ˜i,t = ρiγ˜i,t−1 + vi,t,
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Under imperfect knowledge, g˜i,t is observable while γ˜i,t, ui,t, and vi,t are not. Define
ˆ˜γi,t|s = E(γ˜i,t|g˜i,0, . . . , g˜i,s) as the forecasted value of the technological growth’s persistent
component at time t given all available observations of the growth rate up to period s; the
forecast variance is Σi,t|s = E
[
(γ˜i,t− ˆ˜γi,t|s)2
]
. Then, the following four equations summarize
Kalman learning:
Time update:
ˆ˜γi,t+1|t = ρi ˆ˜γi,t|t;
Σi,t+1|t = ρ2iΣi,t|t + σ2i,v;
Measurement update:
ˆ˜γi,t|t = ˆ˜γi,t|t−1 + Σi,t|t−1(Σi,t|t−1 + σ2i,u)−1(g˜t − ˆ˜γi,t|t−1);
Σi,t|t = Σi,t|t−1 − Σi,t|t−1(Σi,t|t−1 + σ2i,u)−1Σi,t|t−1.
This system can be combined into two equations:
ˆ˜γi,t|t = ˆ˜γi,t−1|t−1 + Σi,t|t−1(Σi,t|t−1 + σ2i,u)−1(g˜t − ˆ˜γi,t−1|t−1); (A.54)
Σi,t+1|t = ρ2iΣi,t|t−1 − ρ2iΣ2i,t|t−1(Σi,t|t−1 + σ2i,u)−1 + σ2i,v, (A.55)
where Σi,t|t−1(Σi,t|t−1 + σ2i,u)−1 is the Kalman gain λi,t. Equation (A.55) is the Ricatti
recursion, and the steady-state filtering implies that that the forecast variance Σi,t+1|t is
constant. Solving (A.55) for the steady-state variance Σi yields the expression for the
steady-state Kalman gain:
λi =
di − (1− ρ2i ) +
√
(1− ρ2i )2 + d2i + 2(1 + ρ2i )di
2 + di − (1− ρ2i ) +
√
(1− ρ2i )2 + d2i + 2(1 + ρ2i )di
, (A.56)
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where di = σ2v,i/σ2u,i. Letting ˆ˜γi,t = ˆ˜γi,t|t, the updating equation for the value of persistent
component becomes
ˆ˜γi,t = λig˜i,t + (1− λi)ρi ˆ˜γi,t−1.
A.1.6 Decomposition of Technology Processes
Recall equations (1.26) and (1.27):
for i ∈ {y, x, k}, lnAi,t = lnAi,t−1 + γi,t + ui,t, ui,t ∼ N(0, σ2u,i), i.i.d.
γi,t = (1− ρi)γi + ρiγi,t−1 + vi,t, vi,t ∼ N(0, σ2v,i), i.i.d.
Define γ˜i,t = γi,t − γi and reformulate the technology process:
lnAi,t = ai,t + γit− ρi1−ρi γ˜i,t;
ai,t = ai,t−1 + 11−ρi vi,t + ui,t.
The last equation illustrates how the technology process is captured by different parts of
the system (1.31): ai,t is the non-stationary stochastic component that is captured by the
state vector s2,t = (ay,t, ak,t, ax,t)′ defined by equation (1.33); and γit is the deterministic
trend component captured by the term Φ3t in the system. The last component γ˜i,t of the
technology process is stationary and is a part of vector s1,t. Notice that the linear system
(1.33) describing the evolution of s2,t is the exact solution—that is, log-linearization is
applied only to the stationary part of the model, and the fact that the model is non-
stationary does not add imprecision to log-linearization as a method to approximate the
solution of the model.
A.2 Description of the Data
Aggregate Consumption : real personal consumption expenditures, nondurable goods
and services (seasonally adjusted, chained 2009 dollars, Table 2.3.3), divided by civil-
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ian noninstitutional population (CNP16OV), and logged. Source: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Nonresidential Investment : real private fixed nonresidential investment (seasonally
adjusted, chained 2009 dollars, Table 5.3.6), divided by civilian noninstitutional pop-
ulation (CNP16OV), and logged. Source: BEA, BLS
Residential Investment : real private fixed residential investment (seasonally adjusted,
chained 2009 dollars, Table 5.3.6), divided by civilian noninstitutional population
(CNP16OV), and logged. Source: BEA, BLS
House Price : All-Transactions House Price Index (USSTHPI), divided by Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers, all items less shelter (CUUR0000SA0L2),
logged, and cleared of seasonal component using X-12-ARIMA algorithm. Source:
Federal Housing Finance Agency, BLS
A.3 Redistributional impact of uncertainty
Figure A.1 shows the redistributional impact of imperfect knowledge in case of a negative
persistent shock to consumption technology. Inititally, households over-optimistically bet
on transitory shock and quick recovery in the near future; as a result, the house price
and the scope of mortgage lending remain higher. Eventually, households learn that the
recession is long. The result is lower house price and higher default rate on mortgages that
prove to be oversized ex post. Borrowers lose net worth and experience a fall in consumption
and housing purchases. Savers, on the contrary, are able to buy cheap housing and maintain
consumption. In effect, the ex-post excessive optimism redistributes wealth from borrowers
to savers. The scope of redistribution is larger if the persistent shock is less volatile, so
that households do not believe in a long recession and learn about it slowly.
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Figure A.1: Impulse responses: redistributional effect of uncertainty in case of persistent
shock to consumption technology vy,t. Percentage deviations of non-detrended variables
from the balanced growth path due to one-standard-deviation negative shock. Solid lines
represent the case of certainty; dashed lines represent uncertainty. For default rate, the
values are absolute, compared with their steady-state values (dotted lines). Numbers near
the arrows show where the deviations will stabilize after 400 quarters.
Appendix B
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 2
In this section of the appendix, figures B.1–B.6 represent the quality of the output simu-
lated by the MH algorithm (plotted series, sample auto-correlations, and recursive means).
Figures B.7–B.8 plot historical variance decomposition of the observed data as interpreted
by the model with perfect knowledge about persistence of shocks.
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Figure B.1: Simulated series: model with perfect knowledge. MH algorithm is used to
obtain 450,000 simulations, where the first 49,999 are counted as burn-in stage. Then,
every 100th observation is retained to get the sample of size M = 4, 001.
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Figure B.2: Simulated series: model with imperfect knowledge. MH algorithm is used to
obtain 450,000 simulations, where the first 49,999 are counted as burn-in stage. Then,
every 100th observation is retained to get the sample of size M = 4, 001.
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Figure B.3: Serial correlation of the series: model with perfect knowledge. For the shock
processes that have near-zero standard deviations, the simulated series of the standard
deviations and the associated AR coefficients exhibit high serial correlation.
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Figure B.4: Serial correlation of the series: model with imperfect knowledge. For the shock
processes that have near-zero standard deviations, the simulated series of the standard
deviations and the associated AR coefficients exhibit high serial correlation.
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Figure B.5: Recursive sample means: model with perfect knowledge. Series that exhibit
high serial correlation converge poorly.
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Figure B.6: Recursive sample means: model with imperfect knowledge. Series that exhibit
high serial correlation converge poorly.
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Figure B.7: Historical variance decomposition, perfect knowledge, aggregate consumption and capital investment. White dots
represent the observed percentage growth in the variables; bar heights represent contributions of each of the shock to the growth.
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Figure B.8: Historical variance decomposition, perfect knowledge, residential investment and house price. White dots represent
the observed percentage growth in the variables; bar heights represent contributions of each of the shock to the growth.
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